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From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: Freedom = Determinism = Random
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Date: Tue, 30 Jan 1996 20:24:22 GMT
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In article <4eev9a$3gs@news.cc.ucf.edu>,
Thomas Clarke <clarke@acme.ucf.edu> wrote:
>In article <4edl00$d1o@ccshst05.cs.uoguelph.ca> icarcar@uoguelph.ca (Iskander Carcar) writes:
>>In my opinion, I don't believe randomness is _necessary_ for choice.  I can
>>very well make a decision which has nothing random about it, which is 
>>based on clear (non-random) reasons.
>
>Dear me, I seem to have caused a great deal of sound and furry
>with my statement that randomness is necessary for free will.
>
>First, let me say that I agree with you and that I still think
>my statement is true.

You said and (seem to continue to say) that randomness is necessary to choice.
But if you can choice without randomness, then randomness is not necessary.
This follows directly from the common meaning of "necessary".  If you mean
something differnt, you should choose different words.

>I am just on a different line of the dictionary
>with the key words.  

I find no dictionary line that supports your usage.

>There is certainly nothing (that is not necessary) 
>random (that is capricious) about rational choice.
>
>However, since I do not have access to all your knowledge, all your
>personal experience, to me as an outside observer,
>
>your free choice will (that is necessarily) be 
>in general unpredictable (that is random).

Unpredictability is *not* the same as randomness.  Weather patterns are
unpredictable, but they are not *random*.  "Random" means lacking in
aim, direction, or order.

In any case, being *generally* random is independent of being *necessarily*
random.  If randomness is *necessary* to choice, then choice that doesn't
entail randomness is *impossible*.  But it ain't.  Willful agents (granting
that we can talk about such things) will be perfectly predictable if they obey
their own best interests, if those interests are clearly enough delineated and
analyzable.  I count on drivers on the other side of the road not crossing the
line.  This isn't because of my philosophical stance concerning their freedom
of will.  If you want to arbitrarily ignore "external contingencies" that
determine "best interests", then you end up with a completely hollow notion of
choice with no consequences.  Choices with no consequences
may well be random, but so what?

>>I see no paradox between determinism and a free choice, because I believe 
>>our decisions are determined, determined by us.
>
>But there's the rub.  Physics (non-quantum, non-chaos physics anyway)
>says that everything is predictable, that is non-random. 

So if you eliminate the aspects of physics that interfere with predictability,
then everything is predictable.  Duh.  But as Minsky has pointed out, even
eliminating chaos doesn't eliminate unpredictability, and even having it
doesn't deny predictability to sufficient technology.

>If you are part of the physical world and hence subject to physics,
>then you are predictable.  Your actions are determined by physics,
>not by you.

Human behavior is complex enough to be generally unpredictable by other
humans.  If we (erroneously, IMO) view this unpredictability as implying free
will, that makes unpredictability *sufficient* for free will.  But lack of
information or technology is sufficient for unpredictability, and thus free
will (in this erroneous view).  In no case is quantum indeterminism necessary.
-- 
<J Q B>

