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From: jeff@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Open Letter to Professor Penrose
Message-ID: <DL4rDx.7F1.0.macbeth@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK
References: <4cp242$lgm@bell.maths.tcd.ie> <DKvsF0.MI2@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <1996Jan12.101306.111722@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu>
Distribution: inet
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 17:32:21 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.physics:164881 sci.physics.particle:7304 sci.math:132305 sci.math.symbolic:20656 sci.logic:16554 comp.ai:35883 comp.ai.philosophy:36576 sci.philosophy.meta:23061

In article <1996Jan12.101306.111722@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> lseib@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes:
>In article <DKvsF0.MI2@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>, pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>>bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>>>
>>>>I don't get it.  When I try to convince others of my views, I do so by
>>>>talking or writing.  Either way it's a physical act, and through a
>>>>chain of events induces physical changes inside the brain of the
>>>>person I'm trying to convince.  Where's the problem?
>  
>It would seem that the free will believers think that without free
>will, they can simply give up performing undesirable tasks.  The 
>rational being that since they cannot change their destiny, they
>are not changing anything by being lazy.

It's necessary to be careful when talking of "the free will
believers", or (later) "the free will people", because there 
are a number of different views.

Still, you're right that a lack of free will does not imply that our
actions do not change our destiny (ie, what happens to us in the end).
The problem is that we (supposedly) cannot choose our actions.

This may be a place where the free will and fatalism issues
diverge.  If everything is fated, then the issues are much the same
for fatalism and <determinism as a (supposed) reason why we lack free
will>.  But fate is often seen as determining certain key results
rather than everything.

For instance, you're told you'll die in city C, and so you try to
avoid going there.  You're not necessarily thought to be _fated_ to 
do this avoiding.  And if you were in a story, circumstances would
conspire to get you to C anyway.  (Didn't something like this happen
to Frederick the Great?)  So fate seems to fix the end, but not how
you get there.

Consider, for instance, "The Fatalist" in Lermontov's novel _A Hero of
our Time_.  (See http://www.datatext.co.uk/library/lmontov/hero/7.htm)

There's also a view, expressed e.g. by Beowolf, that even the
end may be subject to change.  (B says fate sometimes spares
a man if his courage is good.)

-- jd
