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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: FIRST order?
Message-ID: <DBvKwn.J0r@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <DBo4L9.1ws@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <3u3ul0$mnr@saba.info.ucla.edu> <DBq20x.BJH@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <3u74vc$onl@saba.info.ucla.edu>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 1995 19:31:34 GMT
Lines: 159
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai:31621 comp.ai.philosophy:30427 sci.logic:12633 sci.cognitive:8374

In article <3u74vc$onl@saba.info.ucla.edu>,
Michael Zeleny <zeleny@sepulveda.math.ucla.edu> wrote:
>pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>Michael Zeleny <zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu> wrote:
>>>pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>>>Michael Zeleny <zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu> wrote:
>>>>>pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>>>>>Michael Zeleny <zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu> wrote:
>
>>>>>>................
>>>>>>>The trouble with your proposed resolution is that I do not regard your
>>>>>>>stance as merely unacceptable, but as both factually and morally wrong.
>                                                               ^^^^^^^
>>>>>>Says who?
>
>>>>>It makes no difference who says it, unless you are a moral relativist,
>>>>>in which case it still makes no difference.
>
>>>>I can see two possible interpretations of your reply:
>
>>>Your grasp of interpretive possibility is severely impoverished.
>
>>Empty talk. Can you provide any substance?
>
>I have adduced a third interpretation, which you have not surmised or
>acknowledged.  Other possibilities doubtless exist.  Ergo, your grasp
>of interpretive possibility is severely impoverished.
>
Your "third" possibility (presumably the one below, referring to "people
should take note of correct moral judgements....)" is not a third possibility
at all, it is again 1 and/or 2.
I have asked you about the source of your judgement that David Longley's
stance is "morally wrong". You spew meangless comments about my alleged mental
powers, but do not provide the answer. You are either unable or unwilling 
to do so. If the former, then your comments about me in fact apply to
you. If the latter, then you are dishonest as a discussion participant.

>>>>1. You think that people should take note of your moral judgements 
>>>>   (arrogance at best since private moral preferences are not under
>>>>   discussion here).
>>>>2. You are ducking the question since you realized that the statement
>>>>   above made you look silly.
>>>>Did I miss something? (actually it may very well be 1+2).
>
>>>I think that people should take note of correct moral judgements
>                                          ^^^^^^^
>>>regardless of their provenance.  When you are apprised that your
>
>>I cannot believe that you are this thick, you must be pretending. 
>>However, I'll play along and explain clearly: I am asking what is your
>>criterion if a given moral judgment is correct or not, got it?
>
>This is a funny paraphrase of your original question: "Says who?"
>Your communicative efforts might not appear so crippled if you could
>see your way to using standard English idiom.  In any event, a given

Yes, my communicative efforts might not appear so crippled if you efforts at
understanding were less crippled.

>moral judgment is correct if and only if it accords with the laws of
>reason.
>
You mean that they do not depend on starting axioms? I have been asking you 
about the source of these axioms, don't pretend that you do not understand.

>>>calculation is wrong, your first reaction should be to check its
>>>correctness, rather than inquire "Says who?"  The same is true of
>>>moral judgment.
>
>>If I was confident of my calculations, whether I took the trouble to 
>>recheck my calculations would depend on who put them in doubt.
>
>Would it not depend even more on the grounds adduced for so doing?
>
If there were any grounds given, yes. However, you do not give any grounds,
this is the whole point, you just say "morally wrong" - where are the grounds?
Asking "Says who?" I have just asked for the grounds, because moral judgements
boil down to the moral axioms, and there are different sets around (to make
this explicit I have enumerated few sources in attempting to clarify what 
I thought would be clear enough for you; obviously I had overestimated you) 

>>Moral judgments are not calculations, they are usually based on a code
>>which people take as given. I am trying to find out what code you are
>>using (I do not see anything "morally wrong" in David Langley's stance).
>
>A reasonable request at last.  Morally acceptable commerce between

I am happy I have at last found a way to explain to you what should have been
clear from the start. I appologise for making it too difficult for you.

>autonomous rational agents likely to come in conflict in exercising
>their will, depends on the possibility of communication between them.
>If such communication is not possible, neither is morality.
>
So you understand the request, but still do not provide the answer, choosing
to pronounce your valuable opinions on an issue irrelevant to my request.
Very much Eliza-like.

>>>>So do you have guts to give a straight reply to the question? (You know, 
>>>>like "me", "Pope", "Ayatollah X", "Holy Script Y", etc.). You are not 
>>>>ashamed and/or uncertain of the source of your moral judgements, are you? 
>
>>>You have an interesting propensity for projecting a deeply seated
>>>feeling of personal inadequacy.  If you are concerned with locating
>>>its source, I recommend rational introspection, the same faculty that
>>>readily demonstrates moral inadequacy of gainsaying the possibility of
>>>communication.
>
>>Obviously your reply is an example of a projection. I have merely given
>>few examples so that you could grasp what I am asking about.
>
>In addition to giving examples, you have also volunteered an
>inapposite and unwarranted conjecture about my character flaws.
>
You have started voluntieering inapposite and unwarranted conjectures about me.
This of course is fine and "morally appropriate". I am still wondering where
do you get your moral axioms from.

.................
>Since you have started this exchange, you are always welcome to stop it.
>
You are right, I do not have more time to waste. The past experience suggests
that you just have to have the last word, feel free this time too.
Additionally, there seem to be people who would have a mental breakdown, if 
they did not have the last word, I do not want to feel responsible.

>>In another posting (a reply to Aaron Sloman) you wrote:
>
>>>...........................There must exist a core
>>>of scientific and moral knowledge, which should be held immune against
>>>revision based on empirical findings.
>
>>If you hold these sort of convictions, then there is not much to discuss.
>>Just tell us who is the prophet whose view of scientific and moral knowledge
>>is the "correct one". You seem to behave like you think that have find this 
>>knowledge.  Are you the ONE?
>
>I have said nothing that implies recognition, arrogation, or
>assumption of personal authority in this or any other matter.
>
Stating that something is "morally wrong" and talking about "correct moral 
judgements"  and refusing to justify and explain these statements does
imply arrogance and assumption of personal authority, whether you recognize
it or not. 

>>(BTW, you call Aaron Sloman 'dogmatic' - perhaps you should consult your
>>dictionary).
>
>Evidently consulting a dictionary did not suffice to enable you to
>read for content.  Consider perusing a grammar book next time.
>
Reading for content is possible only if a text contains content.

Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
