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From: jcawkwel@mlsma.mlm.att.com (Jack Cawkwell)
Subject: Re: Intensionality in science. (Was FIRST order? was: why...)
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Date: Mon, 17 Jul 1995 11:55:58 GMT
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In article <805753766snz@longley.demon.co.uk>,
David Longley  <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <DBpF5E.rt@ssbunews.ih.att.com>
>           jcawkwel@mlsma.mlm.att.com "Jack Cawkwell" writes:
>
>> Aaron Sloman stated in this discussion that "thinking is a behaviour",
>> but perhaps this statement needs some more precision.
>> 
>> Surely "thinking" is a number of different activities. One activity
>> is "perception" which can never be passive, and is always dependent on
>> the observer, and so is usefully called a behaviour. "I perceive" 
>> 
>> There may be other aspects to thinking, for example the use of an abstract
>> mathematical model; but once selected, I am not sure why it would be useful
>> to call this sort of thinking a behaviour? "I state theorem A" -
>> could be represented by ink on paper in a maths book, which is hard to
>> imagine as a behaviour.
>> 
>> -- 
>> Jack Cawkwell
>> 
>> AT&T Malmesbury SN16 9NA UK
>> Jack.Cawkwell@att.com +44 666 832295
>> 
>Just one small comment here. In 'The Five Milestone's of Empiricism' Quine
>points out how empiricism has progressively moved from  the  idea,  to the
>word, to  sentences,  systems of sentences and theories. Hence my emphasis 
>on language. In language we can at least  get  at  what  is  syntactically 
>there. Thinking, and other propositional attitudes are problematic in that
>they take a common form, the 'that clause'. This is why we get:
>
>    'Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but  assimilates 
>    it to empirical psychology.......The naturalistic philosopher 
>    begins  his reasoning within the inherited world theory as  a 
>    going  concern.  He  tentatively  believes  all  of  it,  but 
>    believes  also that some unidentified portions are wrong.  He 
>    tries  to  improve, clarify, and understand the  system  from 
>    within. He is the busy sailor adrift on Neuraths's boat.'
>
>    W. V. O. Quine (1975)
>    Five Milestones of Empiricism
>    Theories and Things (1981)
>
>and most significantly:
>
>    'The  keynote  of  the  mental is not the  mind;  it  is  the 
>    content-clause syntax,  the idiom 'that p'.'
>
>    W.V.O Quine (1990)
>    Intension 
>    The Pursuit of Truth p.71
>
>This is what I would like to see worked out more thoroughly. It is  a
>very difficult notion to hold on to, as I'm sure many will experience.
>'The Pursuit of Truth' is, surely, as many familiar with the  origins
>of Logical Positivism/Empiricism will appreciate (Schlick's remarks),
>a philosophy of science - (as 'philosophy enough').
>-- 
>David Longley

Appologies for not having followed the whole discussion, but would you
explain what is meant by the 'that p' idiom?

Is the experimental philosophy of Karl Popper now out of date, or simply
not relevant here.

Thanks, 
-- 
Jack Cawkwell

AT&T Malmesbury SN16 9NA UK
Jack.Cawkwell@att.com +44 666 832295
