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From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Thought Question
Message-ID: <1995Jan26.015947.22908@news.media.mit.edu>
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Date: Thu, 26 Jan 1995 01:59:47 GMT
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In article <3g6ff0$1e5@prime.mdata.fi> jsand@mits.mdata.fi (Jan Sand) writes:

>Well, I thought that is fairly obvious. We do not have to deduce
>that we are conscious, it is a matter of very direct experience.

etc.

>.... There is a 
>possibility that you are an idea in an electronic circuit.
>Don't you have doubts about me?
>
>Jan Sand

I have.  I do not doubt that you have some direct experience--but I
don't think that you are very conscious, in the sense of knowing much
more than that things are happening in your mind.  

What you are *not* aware of is any significant amount of detail about
yourself, that is, any more than you know about other people.  (In
other words, I'm agreeing with the Gilbert Ryle stance.)  You have
virtually no ideas at all--and those that you have are probably
wrong--about how you get ideas, what ideas are, where the words come
from when you speak, how you move a finger, and all that sort of
thing.  We share the notion that we have something we call
consciousness that reveals to us a great deal about ourselves, about
our mind, about our feelings, and so forth--but consdiering that we
evidently do not have much such ability, one must conclude that there
is no such thing that actually corresponds to that myth.

