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Article 7387 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts)
Subject: Re: Brain and Mind (quantum consciousness)
Message-ID: <tim.719968383@giaeb>
Sender: news@monu6.cc.monash.edu.au (Usenet system)
Organization: Monash University, Melb., Australia.
References: <1992Oct23.171726.588@cine88.cineca.it>
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 1992 23:13:03 GMT
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avl0@cine88.cineca.it writes:

>In article <tim.719734846@giaeb> tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au (Tim Roberts) said:
>>
>>Why is so much discussion centred around whether something (computer, robot,
>>alien) "has" consciousness ?  This implies something either has consciousness
>>or not, and there is no intermediate state.  This is against almost all
>>biological principles (and other principles too, for that matter - would you
>>contend that a chair had 100% "chair-ness" all the time ?).

>You miss the point. In short consciousness could be "knowing to be something"
>not just "to be something". Does the chair know its chair-ness?
>Moreover, there's not chair-ness in the wood, you have to add an order in your
>wooden mass to obtain the chair with its chair-ness.
>I feel there's something concerning the goal in the thing-ness of a thing.

>You can add an infinity of elements scoring 0 in consciousness (of what?: of them
>selves or of whole they constitute?), asserting that the whole has consciousness
>is *at least* as irrational as admit that consciousness has no intermediate state.
>Otherwise you must postulate a minimum of consciousness in every
>atom, electron and so on. Well: how do you mesured this consciousness?
>How much consciousness has my leg or one of my neurons? (Again, of what?)
>Is my corpse conscious? How much?
>And the situation does not change assigning consciousness to interactions.
>Really it's an "ad hoc" postulate, no more credible than a boojum.

>Biology looks for biological or biochemical phenomena, it can't find anything like
>consciousness as Physics can't assert a thermostat WONT (at a level low as you like)
>to stop heating a room.

Well, I completely disagree (of course, I could be "missing the point" again).
If a Ferrari is fast, are you saying that you can add up the sum of the parts
of the Ferrari (perhaps 2 kph for the steering wheel, etc) to come up with the
speed of the whole car ?

This is clearly nonsense.  The speed only arises out of the assembling of all
of the parts together - the individual parts have no speed whatsoever, just as
an individual neuron has no consciousness.  It is ridiculous to think you can
apply terms relating to high-level concepts to their individual parts.    You
just can't.

Tim

-- 
Tim S Roberts
School of Applied Science                 tel:     051-226467
Monash University (Gippsland)             fax:     051-221348
Switchback Road
Churchill                                 email:   tim@giaeb.cc.monash.edu.au
Victoria 3842
Australia


