From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!haven.umd.edu!mimsy!dawn Mon Oct 19 16:59:49 EDT 1992
Article 7332 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: dawn@umiacs.umd.edu (Dawn Vance)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: AAAI Spring Symposium: Extended Deadline
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Date: 19 Oct 92 14:24:23 GMT
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*********************************************************************
*** NOTE: Because of numerous complaints about poor publicity,
*** the deadline for the following AAAI Spring Symposium has been
*** extended to **NOVEMBER 2, 1992**  Submissions or requests for
*** participation should be received by that date at the address
*** given below.
*********************************************************************

                       
                     CALL FOR PAPERS/PARTICIPATION

                      AAAI SPRING SYMPOSIUM SERIES
                           MARCH 23-25, 1992
                          STANFORD UNIVERSITY
                              STANFORD, CA

                             Symposium on
 
                     REASONING ABOUT MENTAL STATES: 
                    FORMAL THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS


1. Description of the symposium

	Researchers in AI often reason informally in a way that involves
attributing a variety of mental states to machines, and often design
systems that must be able to reason both about their own mental states and
those of others.  This kind of reasoning is common in a number of areas,
including cooperative interfaces for databases, database security,
planning, tutoring, and especially multi-agent coordination.

	Until recently, most formal work on mental states within AI has
concentrated only on a related pair of notions---knowledge and belief.  In
the past few years, however, an increasing reliance on a wide variety of
mentalistic notions in the design and understanding of actual systems has
led to a broadening of this formal work.  As a result, there now exist
within AI formal theories of a number of mentalistic notions and their
close relatives, including: ability, action, choice, commitment, desire,
intention, goals, obligation, perception.

	The aim of this symposium is to bring together researchers working
on formalisms for reasoning about these mentalistic notions, and also
researchers involved in the design of systems that rely upon or incorporate
these notions.  We do not wish to exclude innovative work on knowledge and
belief, especially if it concerns connections with other mental states, but
do explicitly want to emphasize a wider variety of mental states.  We would
expect papers on topics such as the following:

  ** Descriptions of systems, architectures, or theories that rely
explicitly upon reasoning with mentalistic notions (e.g., BDI-style
planning architectures, multi-agent planners, models of discourse and
speech acts);

  ** Formalisms for reasoning about particular mentalistic notions within
particular frameworks (e.g., a dynamic logic for reasoning about intention)
and comparisons between frameworks (e.g., between representations of action
in dynamic and temporal logics), or for reasoning about a number of these
notions and their interactions (e.g., a logic for reasoning about
intention, belief, obligation, and action);

  ** Formalisms for multi-agent mentalistic reasoning and coordination
(e.g., reasoning about the beliefs of one agent concerning the intentions
and beliefs of another);

  ** Realistic (non-idealized) models of these various mental states;

  ** Issues involving the interaction between these various mentalistic
notions and time (e.g., the temporal persistence of commitment);

  ** Issues concerning the computational relevance of sophisticated
philosophical theories of mental states, and perhaps also concerning the
relevance of the recent, detailed models developed within AI for
philosophical theorizing.

	We hope that the symposium will help to focus research on the
development of precise theories for reasoning about a variety of mental
states, and also that it can serve as a forum for interaction between those
working in other areas whose research relies upon these theories and those
concerned primarily with the logic of the matter.


2. Submission and attendance information

	Those wishing to present their work for discussion at the symposium
should submit five physical copies of an extended abstract, no more than
six pages in length.  (Authors whose work is accepted for presentation will
later be asked for a full paper to be included in the symposium
proceedings.)

	Those wishing to attend the symposium without presenting work
should submit a one page statement of their (relevant) research interests.

	All submissions and requests for attendance should be sent to
arrive by **NOVEMBER 2, 1992** at the following address:

	John Horty
	Inst. for Advanced Computer Studies
	A.V. Williams Building
	University of Maryland
	College Park, MD 20742
	USA


3. Program Committee

    Jon Doyle, MIT
    John Horty (co-chair), University of Maryland
    Hector Levesque, University of Toronto
    Martha Pollack,  University of Pittsburgh
    Yoav Shoham (co-chair), Stanford University



