From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!olivea!uunet!tdat!swf Mon Oct 19 16:59:13 EDT 1992
Article 7279 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: swf@teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Ginsberg & Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
Message-ID: <1257@tdat.teradata.COM>
Date: 15 Oct 92 00:13:04 GMT
References: <Bw0GEu.Jp0@unx.sas.com>
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Reply-To: swf@tdat.teradata.com (Stanley Friesen)
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In an article sasmsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com <Mark Riggle> writes:
| I believe that Godel's theorem is NOT the linchpin in Penrose's
| argument.  It is important, but he merely uses Godel's theorem
| to show the limitations of the computablity of currently
| realizable computers. His linchpin conjecture is that
| consciousness is based on the collapse of the quantum
| probability distribution.

The problem with this is that it makes the center of his argument pure
speculation.  His quantum stuff is almost entirely his own ideas, it
is not in any way standard.  Nor is his application of it to neurology
in any way derived from the results of neurobiology.

Thus, it is little more than a 'what if'.

|  Penrose
| turns this around and conjectures that the collapse is
| responsible for providing the 'ultra-computation' required for
| consciousness and the collapse is caused by quantum gravity
| effects. 

The problem is he must first demonstrate the *need* for such 'ultra-
computation'.  Only then can he proceed to provide a mechanism for it.
A mechanism that does not meet any need is purely extraneous.  It can
be dropped without loss.
-- 
sarima@teradata.com			(formerly tdatirv!sarima)
  or
Stanley.Friesen@ElSegundoCA.ncr.com


