From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!rutgers!micro-heart-of-gold.mit.edu!news.media.mit.edu!minsky Mon Oct 19 16:58:59 EDT 1992
Article 7259 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Simulated Brain
Message-ID: <1992Oct14.023633.14791@news.media.mit.edu>
Date: 14 Oct 92 02:36:33 GMT
References: <1992Oct12.185533.6092@spss.com> <1992Oct12.220803.15594@news.media.mit.edu> <26864@castle.ed.ac.uk>
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In article <26864@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>In article <1992Oct12.220803.15594@news.media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:
 ( rest deleted -- back to Chris Malcolm)

>Searle quite clearly has said that he thinks it is obvious that a
>digital computer could think, just that it couldn't do so solely by
>virtue of running a program.
>
>Here's the relevant quote from the reply by Searle to critics in the
>original 1980 BBS airing of the arguments.
>
>"`Could a machine think?'
>"... yes. We are precisely such machines.
>"`... could a ... man-made machine think?'
>[Searle answers yes, obviously, just by duplicating all the biological
>machinery.]
>"`Ok, but could a digital computer think?'
>
>"If by "digital computer" we mean anything at all which has a level of
>description where it can be correctly described as the instantiation of
>a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we
>are the instantiation of any number of computer programs and we can
>think.
>
>"`But could something think, understand, etc, _solely_ by virtue of
>being a computer with the right sort of program? Could instantiating a
>program, the right program of course, by itself be a sufficient
>condition of understanding?'
>
>"This I think is the right question to ask, though it is usually confused
>with one or more of the earlier questions, and the answer to it is "no".
>
>[My quotation comes from p300 of Haugeland's "Mind Design".]
>
>So clearly Searle has thought this way -- i.e., as he _explicitly_ says
>above, that a digital computer could think -- for at least a dozen
>years, and a _dozen_years_ago_ was complaining in print of exactly the
>sort of misunderstanding of his views which has characterised most of
>the discussions of the Searle in this newsgroup since its inception.

I'm still having trouble.  This seems to say that a computer could
think, with the right program, but not _solely_ by virtue of being a
computer with the right sort of program? So there must be another
secret ingredient, e.g., the virtue of sentience or, let's say, a
soul.  I see no reason to consider this more seriously than any other
religious or vitalistic bit of dogma.  Do you disagree?  Why can't I
insist that a Boojum is necessary as well.

On second thought, I think I better postulate two Boojums.  Otherwise
what would we say if Searle declares that thinking cannot occur
_solely_ by virtue of a single Boojum?

Help. please.

.


