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Article 5958 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: clarke@acme.ucf.edu (Thomas Clarke)
Subject: Re: figure/grounding
Message-ID: <1992May28.120719.29976@cs.ucf.edu>
Sender: news@cs.ucf.edu (News system)
Organization: University of Central Florida
References: <1992May27.164400.18066@guinness.idbsu.edu>
Date: Thu, 28 May 1992 12:07:19 GMT
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In article <1992May27.164400.18066@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu  
(Randall Holmes) writes:
> In article <1992May27.122822.18483@cs.ucf.edu> clarke@acme.ucf.edu
> (Thomas Clarke) writes:
> [...]
> 
> >Symbols are linguistic/philosophical.  The current discusion about 
> >grounding etc. would be just as meaningful if quantum mechanics had
> >not been discovered (invented for non-idealists) and the point at 
> >issue was the possible consciousness of Babbage's latest engine.
> 
> which should be a strong hint that QM has nothing to do with the
> issue.
>
I'll have to be more careful about my phrasing.  I was trying to make
the point that symbols can be discussed indepently of physics.  QM is
presumably needed for transistors and modern computers. This discussion
held pre-QM (pre-chaos also) would not have available the possible 
grounding loophole provided by QM (or chaos) so that any discussion 
of non-symbolic effects arising through physics would seem nonsense.  
I don't think it is so nonsensical now in our post-QM world, though.  
> 
> >
> >As I am fond of pointing out, the philosophical problems of
> >quantum mechanics provide convenient loopholes for Harnad's grounding
> >(and even Searle's powers) to operate without postulating undiscovered
> >physical mechanisms.
> 
> The "philosophical problems of QM" are not problems with QM.  They are
> problems with the (admittedly dominant) Copenhagen interpretation of
> QM which is philosophically very dubious.  (I know it is fruitless to
> say this, but it must be said every now and then).
> 
Agreed.  QM, the mathematical physical theory is the most successful ever.  
But what are the equations about?  The results of observations by 
observers?  Must the observers be conscious?
> >
> >Quantum philosophers have to reason very fast to keep mind/consciousness
> >out of matter.
> 
> QM encourages one to abandon strict determinism.  This is the _only_
> philosophical effect of QM.  As soon as one adopts a different
> "interpretation" of QM (try the many-worlds interpretation, for
> instance), the intrusion of mind/consciousness into the physics goes
> away; it is strictly an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation.  I
> am not recommending an interpretation; I am pointing out that the
> interpretation that is in use is not part of the physics, and imports
> some weird philosophical consequences which are not warranted by the
> physics.  (Many-worlds also has weird consequences, but they are on a
> different level, and more in line with the weirdness of the physics).
>
I don't think the consciousness problem in QM goes away so easily.
In my reading of Everett, many worlds says QM is about the superposition
of all possible eigenstates etc. etc. whose evolution is governed in
a continous way (no wave function collapse needed) by Schrodinger's
equation etc.  The kick is, we can only follow one world at a time.  Why?
It sounds to me like me the same old problem of the conscious observer
intruding under another guise.

Many worlds thought experiment:  
An atom bomb explosion is a quantum event since the yield is determined
by the exact timing of radioactive decays that initiate the chain reaction
as the core is compressed.  
Your history is involved in a nuclear exchange.  Quantum mechanically, 
the nuke targeted at your city is a superposition of a dud and a fatally
strong explosion.
What do you observe?  Not the strong explosion; you're dead. But how
can this setup guarantee observation of the dud?  Is observation of
nothing a possibility?  Does the world end? 

Excuse the digression, but I always wanted to right that down :-) Did
you catch the Northern Exposure episode where many worlds was discussed?
> 
>   The current debate shows that philosophers of the mind
> >have to reason sharply to keep physics out of the mind.  Perhaps
> >it is time to admit the possibility that mind and matter may be 
> >inextricably mixed up in some mysterious way.
> 
> There isn't anything particularly mysterious about it; it all falls
> out very neatly when we give up ascribing occult powers to ourselves.
> The details are mysterious (a matter for delicate scientific
> investigation) but the broad picture practically draws itself.
> 
> In the case of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, we ascribe occult
> powers to ourselves in order to avoid the obvious consequence of the
> physics -- the state of the observer is _also_ "mixed"; when he opens
> the box with Schrodinger's cat in it, he settles down into a mixture
> of stroking the live fuzzy beast and disposing of the pitiful
> remains...
> 
So there are two you's after the atom decays in the cat's box?
Could be, I suppose.  But I find the prospect of 2^262384 me's and
climbing a little disconcerting, if not mysterious.
>
> Nothing above is to be construed as denying that nondeterministic
> behaviour (chaotic, perhaps related to QM effects) may have something
> to do with the functioning of the mind.  For the record, I don't think
> that such "nondeterminism" has anything to do with the vexed question
> of "free will"; I think that in the cases in which we want to ascribe
> the occult power of "free will" to ourselves, our behaviour is in fact
> (had better be!) "determined".  What such effects may do is save
> Buridan's Ass from starvation (allow us to make choices where there
> are no criteria to justify one choice over the other, but a choice
> must be made), which is worthy, and relevant to our success as
> intelligences, but rather less glamorous.
> 
Here's how I speculate physics might link up with AI.

You build a big intelligence, a humongous look
up table if you've been following earlier threads, full of TTL logic,
perfectly deterministic.  It might turn out that it is not conscious,
it has no qualia etc., despite its outward seeming intelligence.

You build a human brain sized intelligence.  Lots of stuff jammed into
a small box.  Quantum effects are inevitable.  Behold, the universe
conspires to grant this middle sized intelligence consciousness.

You try for a nano-intelligence.  You fail, can't get enought switching
circuits and states into that small a volume.

Of course, with the proper theoretical framework, it might be demonstrable
that the big intelligence is impossible also.  Maybe something along 
the lines of so many gates switching with so much energy in a volume small  
enough for speed exceeds the mass energy density threshold of a black
hole so the big intelligent machine disappears from the universe.

> -- 
> The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
> above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
> opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
> or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu

--
Thomas Clarke
Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida
12424 Research Parkway, Suite 300, Orlando, FL 32826
(407)658-5030, FAX: (407)658-5059
clarke@acme.ucf.edu


