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Article 5893 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding: Real vs. Virtual (formerly "on meaning")
Keywords: symbol, analog, Turing Test, robotics
Message-ID: <1992May25.170646.19783@guinness.idbsu.edu>
Date: 25 May 92 17:06:46 GMT
References: <1992May19.003821.9450@Princeton.EDU> <6904@pkmab.se>
Sender: M. Randall Holmes
Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
Lines: 43
Nntp-Posting-Host: opal

In article <6904@pkmab.se> ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:
>In article <1992May19.003821.9450@Princeton.EDU> harnad@shine.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) writes:
>>A computer simulation of an analog object or state is not the same
>>as that object/state despite the fact that it is computationally
>>equivalent to it: A simulated plane does not really fly, a simulated
>>furnace does not really burn, there is no real motion in a simulated
>>solar system; by the same token, there is no real thinking in a 
>>simulated nervous system. Computational equivalence is not the same
>>as identity.
>
>You are overlooking something. There is nothing about simulation that
>says that if you simulate an instance of X, the simulation can under
>no circumstances itself also satisfy the definition of being another
>instance of X.

I've been itching to say something like this.  There is an
all-embracing counterexample; a simulated reality is a reality.  (so
there is no difference between "virtual" grounding and other kinds --
SHRDLU's environment is real (even if it contains no physical blocks,
it does contain real electromagnetic phenomena in the physical world),
and SHRDLU really interacts with it).  Computational equivalence _is_
the same as identity for computations, so to say that it is not the
same as identity for thinking, you must assume beforehand that
thinking is not a form of computation, which rather begs the question.
In any event, grounding is irrelevant; _our_ experience is not
entirely grounded on sensation; the senses provide the basis for
experience in some sense; they cannot and do not provide the logical
superstructure of experience (which comes, "of course", from our
"experience" of formal ("platonic") realities :-).

[...]
>
>-- 
>Kristoffer Eriksson, Peridot Konsult AB, Hagagatan 6, S-703 40 Oerebro, Sweden
>Phone: +46 19-13 03 60  !  e-mail: ske@pkmab.se
>Fax:   +46 19-11 51 03  !  or ...!{uunet,mcsun}!mail.swip.net!kullmar!pkmab!ske


-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu


