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Article 5873 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: epfaith@twinkies.berkeley.edu (Edward Paul Faith)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding: Real vs. Virtual (formerly "on meaning")
Date: 24 May 1992 05:05:33 GMT
Organization: U.C. Berkeley Math. Department.
Lines: 15
Message-ID: <vn86tINN621@agate.berkeley.edu>
References: <1992May23.152941.12033@psych.toronto.edu> <1992May23.170049.31825@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1992May24.042950.7982@psych.toronto.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: twinkies.berkeley.edu
Keywords: symbol, analog, Turing Test, robotics

Suppose that this universe that we inhabit is a computer simulation
of the real universe.  Dogs in this universe are in fact computer
models of actual dogs, and when I am licked in the face by a dog it
is only a model of a face and a model of a dog and a relation that
corresponds to real licking.  I am not really licked in the face, then,
because my dog is not really a dog and I do not really have a face.

But that's nonsense.  Whatever the ultimate nature of this universe,
even if it is a computer simulation (and hence is not "grounded"),
my dog really is a dog and I really am a human.

And the same will hold true of a computer simulation of this
universe (within the context of the simulation).  So what's the point
of arguing otherwise, unless the point is to prove that this universe is
not a model of any other?


