From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!ccu.umanitoba.ca!zirdum Mon May 25 14:04:54 EDT 1992
Article 5598 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Comments on Searle - What could causal powers be?
Message-ID: <1992May13.001033.14320@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Date: 13 May 92 00:10:33 GMT
References: <1992May7.153022.7943@psych.toronto.edu> <1992May10.041234.8885@ccu.umanitoba.ca> <1992May11.163332.27781@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Lines: 65

In article <1992May11.163332.27781@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <1992May10.041234.8885@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:
>>I have not met any "confortable" duelist, at least not
>>when they have been exposed to philosophy. But, that is
>>another matter, as they say "Ignorance is Bliss!"
>
>I believe our friend, the Mad Russian, was both a comfortable dualist *and*
>exposed to philosophy.
>
And just WHAT do you thing made him MAD?? ;-)
Anyway, it works if you always keep stopping short of
the final logical position this brings you to.
>>>I see no reason why a school of fish, or the Bolivian economy, would 
>>>*necessarily* fail in any of the above criteria you mention.  Perhaps the
>>>most controversial would be the link to the real world, but it seems
>>>to me that such "entities" are indeed linked to the real world, simply in
>>>ways very dissimilar to you or me.  The behavior of a school of fish
>>>is certainly altered by external events, as is the Bolivian economy
>>>(what happens to it when world inflation rises and falls?).
>>
>>Yes, the behaviour is altered, but is the behaviour intelligent?
>>Can it be interpreted as being intelligent? When was the last time
>>that you asked a school of fish to solve a problem, and if you did
>>I would like to know what the reply was.
>
>The previous poster suggested that minds could not *in principle* be
>implemented in a school of fish.  While I do not claim that this 
>*in fact* happens (no, I've never talked to a school of fish), I *do*
>claim that functionalism demands that *in principle* it is possible.
>Otherwise, you've got Searle's causal powers floating around.

I suppose also that functionalism demands that a kidney be
implimentable in a school of fish (actually I'm sure of it!),
but what this actually means I have no idea. Does it mean that
the SOF kidney will actually process blood the same way as a
real kidney, or will it process "information" the same way.
	In one case we are not interested in it because I can
not have a School of fish transplanted into me as a kidney
replacement. I think that you do not have to look very hard
to see the same kind of dichotomy between the school of
fish intelligence, and the real intelligence.
>
>>>This is a tough question, and to be honest I don't have a pat answer.  I
>>>think Searle is right in asserting that pure symbol manipulation, even
>>>implemented, can't yield minds.  However, as far as how minds *are produced,
>>>I haven't a clue...
>>
>>Ok, if you do not know how minds are produced (I don't either)
>>but you should be able to explain at least minimally of what
>>constitutes a mind. If you do not know this either then you
>>have no right claiming that symbol manipulation is not enough!
>
>Jeff Dalton I think has dealt with this issue sufficiently. 

If you call hand waving sufficient! I would still like
you to breifly list in point form how you can claim
that shuffling symbols around is not sufficient for
the implimentation of thought, yet have absolutely
no idea what is sufficient! Lay it on me!
>
-- 
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*   AZ    -- zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca                            *
*     " The first hundred years are the hardest! " - W. Mizner  *
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