From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor Mon May 25 14:04:44 EDT 1992
Article 5580 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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>From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Systems Reply I (repost perhaps)
Message-ID: <1992May12.155026.18797@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCS Public Access
References: <1992Apr14.004021.3628@oracorp.com> <6640@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992May5.195616.28038@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> <6684@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Tue, 12 May 1992 15:50:26 GMT

In article <6684@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992May5.195616.28038@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:

>>Rightly so! After all, deciding if a computer has a mind is the other minds
>>problem, is it not?
>
>No.
>
You mean you do not see any a connection between a problem of deciding if a 
computer has a mind and other mind problem?

>>No, but to argue that another entity (a computer) does not understand, even
>>though it has an identical behaviour (to humans), you have to be able to show 
>>how understanding  arises in humans and then show that this mechanism is not 
>>present in computers.
>
>No I don't.  I can _conclude_ that it's not present.  Like this:
>
>   1. Computers can't understand.
>   2. Mechanims M is necessary for understanding.
>   3. Therefore computers lack M.
>
>All I have to add is an argument whose conclusion is (1).  And that's
>exactly what Searle and others have provided.  Of course there might
>be something wrong with those arguments so that they fail to show
>(1).  If so, we can tell by looking at the arguments whose conclusion
>is (1).  It's flaws in those arguments that make them wrong (if they
>are wrong), not our incomplete knowledge of how humans work.
>
You want to argue that a computer can't understand under following restrictions:
 a) no reference to behaviour - because it is behaviourism;
 b) no reference to specific mechanisms - because we have no idea what 
    mechanisms are responsible for understanding in humans;
 c) no definition of understanding - unecessary, debating tactics, a game etc.
So what is the argumentation going to based on? Some vague, unspoken notion 
of understanding no one is allowed to try to make more concrete? For an argument
to be convincing it has to be based on some specifics most people would agree
on. What are they in this case? No surprise so many people find Searle's
argument vacuous. It is like watching a magician - in the first moment he 
manages to pull wool over your eyes - you are impressed and convinced that he
can violate laws of physics. After a short reflection you see however that
there were so many vague moments that he could have done anything.

>It seems to me that the anti-Searle side must be in pretty severe
>difficulty if instead of pointing out flaws in Searle's reasoning
>they have to try to get the other side to do all the work!
>
It is impossible to point out flaws in someone's arguments if he refuses to 
define the terms he is using. Every time he can get out of trouble by insisting 
that you do not understand what he means. 

>-- jd


-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


