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Article 5533 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum)
Subject: Re: Comments on Searle - What could causal powers be?
Message-ID: <1992May10.041234.8885@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
References: <1992May5.204157.23037@psych.toronto.edu> <1992May06.170835.37164@spss.com> <1992May7.153022.7943@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Sun, 10 May 1992 04:12:34 GMT
Lines: 64

In article <1992May7.153022.7943@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <1992May06.170835.37164@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>
>It may be unfair to talk about "souls", as I would imagine that there are
>many folks who are comfortably dualists, but would not want to use such
>a loaded term.
>
I have not met any "confortable" duelist, at least not
when they have been exposed to philosophy. But, that is
another matter, as they say "Ignorance is Bliss!"
>>
>>4. Because of identifiable characteristics of the brain: e.g. it's a compact,
>>identifiable subsystem in the organism; it contains billions of elements,
>>allowing real-time processing of enormous quantities of data; its processing
>>is not merely symbolic, but is inextricably linked to real-world knowledge
>>and experience, etc.  Such criteria rule out implementations involving schools
>>of fish or the Bolivian economy, and some but perhaps not all computers.
>
>I see no reason why a school of fish, or the Bolivian economy, would 
>*necessarily* fail in any of the above criteria you mention.  Perhaps the
>most controversial would be the link to the real world, but it seems
>to me that such "entities" are indeed linked to the real world, simply in
>ways very dissimilar to you or me.  The behavior of a school of fish
>is certainly altered by external events, as is the Bolivian economy
>(what happens to it when world inflation rises and falls?).

Yes, the behaviour is altered, but is the behaviour intelligent?
Can it be interpreted as being intelligent? When was the last time
that you asked a school of fish to solve a problem, and if you did
I would like to know what the reply was.
> 
>>5. They cause minds like any implementation of an intelligent algorithm does;
>>the similarity to other algorithms is masked by the fact that we can't
>>change or read the algorithm or divorce it from its hardware implementation.
>
>To call algorithms "intelligent" seems to me to be question-begging.
>
>>Well, have I left anything out?  Could some of the AI skeptics suggest
>>where they stand and why?
>
>This is a tough question, and to be honest I don't have a pat answer.  I
>think Searle is right in asserting that pure symbol manipulation, even
>implemented, can't yield minds.  However, as far as how minds *are produced,
>I haven't a clue...

Ok, if you do not know how minds are produced (I don't either)
but you should be able to explain at least minimally of what
constitutes a mind. If you do not know this either then you
have no right claiming that symbol manipulation is not enough!

BTW, the implimentation of an algorithm is as different from
the algorythm as the implimentation of a car is to the
blue prints. The blue prints do not do anything, the car
has "real" behaviour that is not specified in the blue
print!
>
>- michael


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*   AZ    -- zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca                            *
*     " The first hundred years are the hardest! " - W. Mizner  *
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