From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!rpi!batcomputer!cornell!uw-beaver!rex Tue May 12 15:48:39 EDT 1992
Article 5367 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!rpi!batcomputer!cornell!uw-beaver!rex
>From: rex@cs.washington.edu (Rex Jakobovits)
Subject: Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis
Message-ID: <1992May2.031108.7475@beaver.cs.washington.edu>
Sender: news@beaver.cs.washington.edu (USENET News System)
Organization: Computer Science & Engineering, U. of Washington, Seattle
Date: Sat, 2 May 92 03:11:08 GMT
Lines: 21

I am looking for arguments against Newell & Simon's Physical Symbol
Systems Hypothesis (PSSH): "A physical symbol system has the necessary
and sufficient means for general intelligent action."  Elaine Rich
declares this to be the underlying assumption "at the heart of
research in ai".

What are your opinions about this?  Do non-symbolic systems such as
connectionist nets and Brooksian creatures exhibit intelligence,
thereby invalidating the PSSH?  Is there evidence that the human
subconscious does not resort to symbolic processing?  Does this imply
that the power of symbolic level processing is inherently limited?

Can one be skeptical of the PSSH and still believe in AI?

   	Rex Jakobovits (rex@cs.washington.edu)
	Dept. of Computer Science
	University of Washington
-- 
	Rex Jakobovits (rex@cs.washington.edu)
	Dept. of Computer Science
	University of Washington


