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Article 4845 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Mar31.104855.10515@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 31 Mar 92 15:48:53 GMT
References: <45426@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1992Mar28.092723.10365@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Mar31.070425.1633@csustan.csustan.edu>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1992Mar31.070425.1633@csustan.csustan.edu>
tom@csustan.csustan.edu (Tom Carter) writes: 

TC:
>Oh, what a lovely arugment!
>
>Putnam, refuting functionalism, attempts a reductio ad absurdum, to wit:
>
>  The thesis of functionalism would leave us unable to distinguish between
>  a rock and a thinking being (a.k.a., finite automaton).

>Then, in article <1992Mar28.092723.10365@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny), apparently attempting to
>support Putnam's reductio, adduces

MZ:
>> . . . the
>> well-known, demonstrable lack of a sound theoretical distinction between a
>> material object "responding" to input by "producing" output, and another
>> medium-sized piece of dry goods "just sitting there".

TC:
>(i.e., we don't need Putnam's `theorem', which is in essence just a weaker
>form of Zeleny's `demonstrable lack' . . .)

On the contrary, Putnam's argument estabilishes a fact about the relativity
of the notion of functional organization.  On the other hand, outside of
the functionalist context, precise identity conditions for living beings
could be given on the basis of Aristotelian vitalism, calling for the
persistence of structural organization; on the other hand, the minds of
sentient beings could be individuated by the Lockean subjective criteria of
continuity of memory and volition.  Naturally, neither move is available to
a strict materialist.

In other words, I am talking about inanimate material objects; see Peter
van Inwagen's book "Material Beings" for an overview of the identity
problem. 

TC:
>I suppose then the only difficulty is in figuring out exactly what it is
>that has been reduced to the absurd :-)

Be my guest.  Incidentally, if you can formulate a theoretical distinction
between a material object "responding" to input by "producing" output, and
another material object "just sitting there", please let the world know
about it.  Note that such a distinction would depend on their identity
criteria. 

>Tom Carter                      tom@csustan.csustan.edu


`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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