From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wupost!uunet!psinntp!scylla!daryl Tue Apr  7 23:23:18 EDT 1992
Article 4827 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wupost!uunet!psinntp!scylla!daryl
>From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: A rock implements every FSA
Message-ID: <1992Mar30.164508.13978@oracorp.com>
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 1992 16:45:08 GMT
Lines: 48

chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
(in response to Mikhail Zeleny)

>I note that this doesn't address the substance of my objection.  It
>probably doesn't matter much, as that objection was made under the
>assumption that you, following Putnam, were mapping inputs to inputs
>and states to states ("the relevant remarks on p. 124" can only be
>read that way).  Your exchange with Joseph O'Rourke has made it clear
>that in fact you're mapping both inputs and states of the FSA
>simultaneously onto internal states of the rock, which may as well be
>entirely causally disconnected from the outside world.

>This is an audacious strategy; if one allowed such mappings, then
>anything might follow.

It is certainly true that in the mathematical theory of finite
automata, a big distinction is made between "inputs" and "states".
However, I don't think that this distinction is fundamental. For a
real system, such as a computer or a human being, an input is
essentially a non-destructive state transition with an external cause.
If you do as Mikhail suggests, and map inputs and states to rock
states, there is nothing particularly wrong, except for the difficulty
of communicating with the rock. There is no easy mechanism for causing
the rock to go into the state corresponding to having recieved input
i. This difficulty can be viewed as a defect in the sensory mechanisms
of the rock, rather than a defect in the "thought processes" of the
rock. Just as a person being deaf doesn't imply that the person is
unintelligent, perhaps we shouldn't take the difficulty of making
inputs for the rock as evidence of lack of intelligence in the rock.

Note that it is not *impossible* to communicate with the rock, only
very difficult. Since the states of the rock are mapped to pairs of
states and inputs, if you want to make input I, simply *put* the rock
in the state corresponding to <S,I>. This would correspond, in the
case of a deaf person, to simply putting the person's brain in the
state corresponding to having heard a certain sound, even though the
sound wasn't actually received by the ears.

I don't see how functionalism can be liberal enough to grant
intelligence to humans with no working sense organs, and strict enough
to deny intelligence to rocks and clocks and tape players. If getting
the inputs right is important, then I don't see how the
sensation-deprived humans pass the test, and if it isn't important,
then I don't see how rocks fail.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY


