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Article 4785 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: aliens eat fading qualia
Message-ID: <1992Mar29.004644.26430@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Mar23.145207.7892@oracorp.com> <1992Mar23.205033.9268@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 92 00:46:44 GMT

In article <1992Mar23.205033.9268@u.washington.edu> forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis) writes:

>It seems clear to me that if peripherial replacements are to be functionally
>equivalent they must cause the same qualia.  Doesn't this mean there are
>ways to convince oneself (provided the technology exists) that a replacement
>for some neurons do not affect qualia?  One needn't commit oneself to a
>total replacement all at once and if a change in qualia exists one would
>notice it.

I'm sympathetic with what you say, but note that an anti-functionalist
like Searle would have to disagree with the last phrase.  If the second
system is functionally equivalent to the first, it can't "notice" any
change (as that would imply a functional difference).  So an
anti-functionalist who holds that qualia might change while functional
organization stays the same is committed to the empirical possibility
that one's qualia might change without one noticing.  That seems
bizarre, which is the whole point of the fading qualia argument.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


