From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo Tue Apr  7 23:22:21 EDT 1992
Article 4727 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo
>From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Causes and Goals (was re: The Systems Reply I
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar18.230623.22704@a.cs.okstate.edu> <B7J5HB1w164w@ersys.edmonton.ab.ca>
Message-ID: <1992Mar26.013757.9343@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Thu, 26 Mar 1992 01:37:57 GMT

In article <B7J5HB1w164w@ersys.edmonton.ab.ca> arktik@ersys.edmonton.ab.ca (Ryan Daum) writes:
>> 
>>   This is analogous to the computer expressing meaning debate.  The issue
>> here that I keep raising is that there must be an intensional agent SOMEWHERE
                                                         !^!
>> The act itself may not be intensional; however the interpretation must be.
                                 !^!
>> In this way, we can derive the expressive meaning.
>> 
>
> But what about the Existentialist assertion that all actions are 
>intentional in that the existent in question is ultimately capable of 
     !^!
>eradicating them?
>
Are you guys sure you're talking about the same thing? Inten*S*ional
and inten*T*ional mean to entirely different things these day (though 
they have an old etymological connection.
-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
---------------------


