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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Causes and Goals
Message-ID: <1992Mar22.135101.10145@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 22 Mar 92 18:50:58 GMT
References: <1992Mar18.044516.28882@nuscc.nus.sg> <1992Mar18.104311.9986@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Mar20.135455.10831@nuscc.nus.sg>
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In article <1992Mar20.135455.10831@nuscc.nus.sg> 
smoliar@iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar) writes:

>In article <1992Mar18.104311.9986@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Mar18.044516.28882@nuscc.nus.sg> 
>>smoliar@iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar) writes:

SS:
>>>  Just as the question of whether
>>>or not an entity A* constitutes a model of another entity A can only be
>>>resolved in the context of some postulated observer B, so I would argue
>>>that whether or not any entity X is an agent cannot be resolved in terms
>>>of necessary and sufficient conditions on the attributes of X.  Rather,
>>>one can only address whether or not a given observer Y is attributing agency
>>>to X.

MZ:
>>Sure it can be so resolved: see any good text on philosophy of action, e.g.
>>O'Shaughnessy's "The Will".

SS:
>I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask for a precis again, Mikhail.  You seem to
>assume that everyone who logs in from a university address has access to a
>library of your own standards.  I regret to inform you that philosophy is
>not taken very seriously as an academic discipline here, and the library
>suffers for that.  I have now begun to supplement my library with a Visa
>card and the good graces of book stores that do business by FAX;  but the
>turn-around time is a bit slow for discussions such as these.  Please elaborate
>your apparently intuitively obvious resolution.

As much as I would like to comply with your request, I feel unable to do so
in good conscience.  This exchange is supposed to be a dialogue; when I
wish to act on behalf of both parties in a dialectical exchange, I write it
all by myself.

MZ:
>>  Given the existence of viable theories of
>>agency that agree with my naive pre-theoretic intuitions thereof, I submit
>>that the burden of proof of non-existence of agency lies on the purveyors
>>of Dennetian "intentional stance" nonsense.

SS:
>I would hope that your "naive pre-theoretic intuitions" would be willing to
>recognize that there are people in the world who do not share those intuitions.

Regrettably, there are also people in the world who insist on making
technical arguments without bothering to learn the first thing about the
discipline in question.  Your buddy Marvin can tell you everything he
believes about agency ("there is no such thing"); why ask me?

SS:
>I am glad your powers of reason are so strong as to enable you to convince
>yourself on such matters of agency.  For my part, I have always taken a liking
>to the following passage from "On Denoting" by Bertrand Russell (whom I have
>never regarded as one of the "purveyors of Dennetian 'intentional stance'
>nonsense"):
>
>	A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing
>	with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about
>	logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible,
>	since these serve much the same purpose as is served by
>	experiments in physical science.
>
>I see no reason why any discussion about agency cannot be furthered by dwelling
>on such puzzles, most of which would involved trying to conceive of situations
>which may contradict certain assumptions we tend to make about specific
>entities, such as clouds, having or lacking agency.

To paraphrase another non-Dennettian philosopher, hard puzzles make for bad
rules.  I am quite comfortable with the assumptions I make about the lack
of agency in a cloud; however if I should wish to entertain an opposing
view, I'll start with Spinoza's panpsychism, not with Dennett.

MZ:
>>The Hopi mind that remains bound to its irrational tradition *hasn't*
>>grasped the concept of agency.

SS:
>I suppose you can muster no end of resources to justify your use of the word
>"irrational" in that sentence.  Nevertheless, the Hopi have been managing on
>this earth rather well for quite some time (perhaps longer than some
>civilizations who have produced great minds to ponder the question of
>rationality).  I take this as evidence that there are more aspects of
>the behavior of individuals and societies than are dreamt of in your
>philosophy.  This is not to question either the elegance or the power
>of that philosophy;  but every now and then, it is good to hold any discipline
>at arm's length and remind oneself that it, too, has limitations.  Perhaps
>exhibiting behavior that furthers the individual, the species, and the society
>may sometimes carry a bit more weight than philosophical rationality.

I remain bound to the culture that produced me; no matter how much I
question its basic values, I can't deny that their core is simply
non-negotiable for me.  Hence, no "multiculturalism": I feel wholly
justified in judging (and finding lacking) the values of the Hopi nation,
as presented by your example.

MZ:
>>  Feel free to join them; I hear a lot of
>>good things about the potlatch.

SS:
>Since you have the better library, Mikhail, I suggest you make better use of it
>before you shoot from the hip.  You will find no potlatch among the Hopi.  If
>that is what turns your on, you had best head for the Pacific Northwest, as
>Franz Boas did.

I was hoping you would grant me a small poetic license.  In the future,
I'll try to be more literal.

MZ:
>>  Perhaps they can give you some ideas about
>>constructing those NL parsers that, according to your buddy Marv's past
>>selves, we should have been enjoying by now.

SS:
>To bring the discussion back to artificial intelligence, the point I am trying
>to make is that building robot individuals that survive, thrive, and even
>interact beneficially with humans need not rest upon rationality as a
>foundation.  You can attack those who would try to build such rational
>robots all you wish, and I applaud those efforts.  However, I still believe
>it is possible to build functionally successful autonomous robots without
>including your brand of rationality in the specification.

Since your belief is admittedly unsubstantiated by any inquiry into the
nature of personal identity, agency, and rationality, you will undoubtedly
understand my dismissal of it as a mere wish-fulfilling superstition.

MZ:
>>  In return, you could teach
>>them about criteria of agency, like volition and responsibility.

SS:
>Anyone who would deign to teach the Hopi about volition and responsibility
>would have to be endowed with arrogance on the scale of hubris;  I suspect
>you, Mikhail, would be far better qualified for this task than I.

Ah, Stephen, you needn't be so modest about your own qualifications!  If I
have to choose between two brands of arrogance, I'll choose the kind that
judges the Hopi to be a primitive nation, over the one that ignorantly
dismisses all of the Western philosophical tradition in one fell swoop.

MZ:
>>  If you wish to claim a Copernican revolution
>>in philosophy, you would have to adduce a proof of a better foundation than
>>a few regurgitated Dennett--Minsky slogans.

SS:
>Actually, I am not interested in making any claims in philosophy.  I'm just
>interested in autonomous robots which manage as well on this globe as various
>animal species (including humans) do.  Nevertheless, I feel that speculating
>about such robots often leads to the sorts of puzzles which Russell felt were
>so valuable to the study of logical theories.

Actually, you are making philosophical claims at this very moment.
Autonomy is a philosophical category par exellence, -- could you tell me
from what sort of laws you wish to exempt your robots?  As for building
robot individuals that survive, thrive, and even interact beneficially with
humans, could you perchance enlighten me as to what would constitute your
automata's individuality, or (observe the lexical meaning) survival?
Finally, what does it mean for an inanimate object to "thrive", or to
"interact beneficially with humans"?  To my unsophisticated eye, it looks
like you are making claims about free will, personal identity, and moral
agency.  Would you care to substantiate them, or are you content with their
apparent meaninglessness?

MZ:
>>  The general case of agency has
>>been treated extensively by major philosophers over the past two and a half
>>millenia.  Its main problematics are well known, its criteria --- well
>>established.  If you wish to challenge this tradition, you have to address
>>it squarely, instead of dismissing it with faux naif homiletic appeals to
>>Hopi religion, and its "civilized" counterpart, politically correct
>>multiculturalism.

SS:
>It is not so much a question of whether or not I am challenging that tradition
>as one of whether it will serve my tool-box in any capacity other than dead
>weight.

Your instrumental approach is nothing new: last time it was applied to the
task of increasing human happiness, it resulted in Auschwitz and Treblinka.
You are explicitly discarding humanistic values for the sake of a pragmatic
goal; rest assured that I will fight you every inch of the way.

MZ:
>>  Should you wish to do that, I'll be happy to continue
>>this discussion; otherwise any such effort will remain as sterile as your
>>robots.  A good common ground for a starting place would be constituted by
>>the relevant articles in the Edwards' encyclopedia, a text that is surely
>>available in your local libraries.

SS:
>Obviously, I cannot ask you to summarize everything.  However, if you are
>talking about a few pages, I shall be happy to provide you (through electronic
>mail) with my FAX number.  You can then perform a service far more valuable
>than any I can get from my local librarians!

Unfortunately, I lack access to a FAX scanner; however the encyclopedia is
readily available as a BOMC bonus.  Should that be inaccessible to you, I
shall be happy to call a few used bookstores, and try to arrange a
shipment.  Last time I looked, the price was under $120.

MZ:
>>>>It is still highly questionable to what extent the laws of biology are
>>>>reducible to those of physics.  My own suspicion is that they aren't; see
>>>>on this Popper and Eccles' "The Self and Its Brain".

SS:
>>>I remember seeing this book back in 1981.  Unfortunately, in my current
>>>straits
>>>(pun sort of intended), I may have a bit of trouble getting myself a copy.
>>>Can
>>>anyone take the trouble to summarize their basic argument as to why biology
>>>cannot be reduced to physics?  (I tend to agree with the conclusion at an
>>>intuitive level, but I would like something a bit more solid than my own
>>>feeble intuition.  I also wonder whether or not the converse might be the
>>>case:  that laws of physics may be reducible to laws of biology.)

MZ:
>>Citing Peter Medawar's "A Geometric Model of Reduction and Emergence",
>>published in Ayala & Dobzhansky's "Studies in the Philosophy of Biology",
>>Popper suggests that the reduction of Ecology/Sociology => Biology =>
>>Chemistry => Physics is not one of logical reducibility, but comparable to
>>the relation between Metrical (Euclidean) Geometry => Affine Geometry =>
>>Projective Geometry => Topology, namely that of enrichment of each higher
>>geometrical discipline through a conservative extension of its deductive
>>structure; so all theorems of projective geometry are valid in a suitable
>>reformulation of metrical geometry in a language capable of employing the
>>concepts of the former discipline.

SS:
>I was kind of hoping that Weemba would pick up on this, since he has a bit
>more grounding in biology.  This does not seem to be very much of an argument.
>It is more like sidling up to the issue and figuring out the right way to
>squint at it.  I once heard Robert Rosen give a talk about running the
>reduction in the opposite direction, but I was too snowed to take any
>useful notes.  (I do recall references to Rashevsky.)  Has anyone encountered
>a more coherent version of his story?

Always on the lookout for a good joke, I would love to hear about a
reduction of physics to sociology.


`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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:                                                             so     :
: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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