From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Mar 24 09:57:08 EST 1992
Article 4583 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar9.185702.22812@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar11.182542.5325@psych.toronto.edu> <19163@castle.ed.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <1992Mar19.020538.11607@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1992 02:05:38 GMT

In article <19163@castle.ed.ac.uk> cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>In article <1992Mar11.182542.5325@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>But the point is that I *can* rule out, from a priori
>>reasoning, how my mental states *don't* get produced, namely, by purely
>>syntactic symbol shuffling.
>
>Exactly. However, one must be careful not to dismiss syntax too
>comprehensively as a a consequence, since nobody has much idea about
>what can be managed with impure syntax.

Well, if you can explain to me how you get *impure* syntax from the
paradigm of syntactic engines, namely, a computer, then we can
consider the question.  


- michael



