From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Mar 24 09:56:01 EST 1992
Article 4482 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar14.222241.21065@oracorp.com>
Message-ID: <1992Mar16.232558.6291@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 1992 23:25:58 GMT

In article <1992Mar14.222241.21065@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
>michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>> I take it as a *fact* about us (or at least me) that we *are* able
>> to connect symbols to the world in such a way as yields meaning (or
>> semantics, or understanding, or whatever).
>
>I agree that it is a fact. All I was saying is that Searle's argument
>that computers can never understand can just as well apply to people
>as computers. Therefore, either (a) there is something magical that
>exempts people from the argument, (b) the argument is wrong, or (c)
>neither people nor computers can understand. Searle believes (a), I
>believe (b), and you are trying to stick me with (c).

To equate "magical" with "non-Functionalist" is to go a long way toward
assuming your conclusion.  As far as I recall (without the context I may
be wrong) I wasn't necessarily claiming that *you* believe we don't have
understanding, I was merely (judging from the emphasis in the passage
quoted) indicating that understanding is *not* a matter of interpretation,
at least for humans.  It is not that we have understanding because our
behaviour can be *interpreted* that way - we have understanding *regardless*
of what interpretation an outside party gives. 

>Of course people are capable of understanding, but as I said, I
>believe that this fact is due to the functional properties of the
>brain and the way the brain is connected to the world through our
>sense organs. What I don't believe is that there is some magical way
>that our thoughts have "semantics" that is not available to computers.

Then what you believe is Functionalism, but you have made no argument
for it here (except labelling any competing hypothesis as "magical"). 

>> Sure, you can deny that humans actually have something called
>> "understanding" or "subjective experience" and thus counter Searle,
>> but to do so it to avoid the question, not to answer it.  If you
>> *don't* think you have something called "understanding," fine.  But
>> then we can't talk...

On second thought, maybe I *was* saying you don't believe we have
understanding...

>I am not denying either understanding or subjective experience. What I
>am denying is that either of these requires something beyond what is
>available to a digital computer.

Fine.  But this is merely an assertion.

>>>In my opinion, the most that can be asked of an intelligent being
>>>(computer or human) is:
>>>
>>>1. It's internal processing produces the right relationships among its
>>>internal patterns.
>>>
>>>2. The being's [connections] to the world produces the right relationship
>>>between the internal patterns and the external world.
>
>> If this is all you want, then Searle shouldn't bother you, because
>> all you want is essentially a behaviouristic account of intelligence.
>> The Chinese Room is an attempt to show that such an account is
>> insufficient, in that it does not necessarily yield our subjective
>> experience of intelligence. If you don't include this subjective
>> component, then everything is hunky-dory. But many people believe
>> subjective experience to be the hallmark of the mental.
>
>I am not denying the reality of subjective experience, but I believe
>that 1. and 2.  above are sufficient for both behavior and subjective
>experience.

In thinking it over, I am not sure if 1. is required by functionalism.
As I understand it, the only functional relations that matter are the ones
between the inputs to the system as a whole and the outputs from the
system as a whole.  In this case we needn't talk about "internal
patterns" as necessary for intelligence - if we did, then some implementations
might be able to pass the Turing Test *without* the right "internal patterns"
and thus not "really" be intelligent (Humoungous Table Lookup, anyone?).  If
I am wrong in characterising functionalism in this way, I am happy to hear the
real story...

 I agree that the Chinese Room is an attempt to show that
>such an account is insufficient, but I think it is a *failed* attempt.

It may very well be failed.  I am having second thoughts about the
sufficiency of its response to the Systems Reply.  Not that I think that
the Systems Reply is *right*, but simply that Searle's counter doesn't
adequately respond to it.

>>>To the extent that this isn't sufficient for true semantics, mortal
>>>beings don't *have* true semantics.
>
>> Well, we certainly have *something*, which might as well be called
>> "true semantics," since the term was developed to describe features of
>> our world.
>
>Maybe I should have said "*If* this isn't sufficient for true
>semantics, mortal beings don't have true semantics." It's not that I
>don't believe that our words have meaning, it is that I don't believe
>that our words have any more meaning than words used by a running
>computer program with the right functionality and interface.

OK, but again this is merely asserting Functionalism.

>> In the end what is needed is a satisfactory account of semantics or
>> meaning. Once we have this, we can then see if purely syntatic
>> devices are the kinds of things which can have these things.
>> Currently, however, all we have are some preliminary attempts at
>> accounting for meaning, and a principled distinction between syntax
>> and semantics.
>
>I don't think that we are lacking for an account of the distinction
>between syntax and semantics. The syntax of a language is its
>intrinsic structural properties (the rules saying what constitutes a
>term, how terms are combined to make sentences, etc.) The semantics is
>the interpretation, which is the mapping from terms and sentences in
>the language to objects and relationships in the intended domain. We
>can classify sentences as syntactically correct or and semantically
>correct regardless of whether it was uttered by a person, a computer,
>or a parrot.
>
>The controversy is not really over syntax versus semantics, it is over
>the question of whether the semantics is somehow "inherent" in the
>system producing the language.

...or alternatively how syntax can generate semantics.  When you state the
differences between the two of them as you have above, I simply cannot see
how you can reduce the one to the other.

- michael




