From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!wupost!uunet!mcsun!uknet!edcastle!cam Tue Mar 24 09:55:58 EST 1992
Article 4477 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <19163@castle.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 16 Mar 92 15:49:19 GMT
References: <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Mar9.185702.22812@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar11.182542.5325@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Edinburgh University
Lines: 13

In article <1992Mar11.182542.5325@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>But the point is that I *can* rule out, from a priori
>reasoning, how my mental states *don't* get produced, namely, by purely
>syntactic symbol shuffling.

Exactly. However, one must be careful not to dismiss syntax too
comprehensively as a a consequence, since nobody has much idea about
what can be managed with impure syntax.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205


