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Article 4473 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Causes and Goals (was re: The Systems Reply I
References: <1992Mar15.170938.9882@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Mar16.005137.13005@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Mar16.003442.9891@husc3.harvard.edu>
Message-ID: <1992Mar16.113928.16657@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: Oklahoma State University, Computer Science, Stillwater
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 92 11:39:28 GMT

In article <1992Mar16.003442.9891@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>In article <1992Mar16.005137.13005@a.cs.okstate.edu> 
>onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
>
CO:
  Mikhail,

  I am turning over the following question to your capable hands:

  The question, in short, is "can an argumentation
  of "to represent" by means of goal alone set a foundation secure enough
  to provide specifications for what its agent should be?"

MZ:

>To the extent that I understand your question, I think it can be
>answered by something I wrote on this subject (please pardon my TeX):

CO REPLY:

  I am not sure that your reply answered my question per se.  However,
it did help me clarify my question.  Please look for the 'revised edition'
of my question following some commentary on your text.

MZ:
>
>According to the traditional definition, a symbol is an iconic or a
>substitutive sign, something that stands for something else, {\it
>aliquid stat pro aliquo}.\footnote{See [N\"oth 1991]: 81.}  In order to
>treat the literary text as a symbol, we must account for the way in
>which this text can be said to mean. Following H.\thinspace
>P.\thinspace Grice's classic discussion, we shall distinguish between
>natural meaning of phenomena merely interpreted as signs in virtue of
>being recognized as effects of a presumed antecedent cause, and
>non-natural, or semantic meaning.\footnote{See his paper ``Meaning'',
>in [Grice 1989].}

CO REPLY:
   Ok, I follow you so far.  Also, I am unfamiliar with Grices paper,
however I will see if I can find a copy of it.  Apparantly, according
to your foot note, it is in a text by Grice.  

MZ:
>Suppose that you wake up in the morning with a fever, catarrh, and runny
>eyes.  Following the rules of medical diagnostic, and taking into
>consideration your knowledge of an epidemic going on, you may conclude that
>an influenza virus is the cause of your discomfort.  In other words, you
>interpret your pain and discomfort as a sign indicating, in the medical
>parlance, a specific febrile zymotic disorder, caused by the onslaught of a
>certain microorganisms, estabilishing by an inferential process known as
>{\it abduction} the likelihood of a causal relation between the viral
>infection and the pain caused thereby.\footnote{We shall consider the
>virus, a non-cellular structure lacking any intrinsic metabolism, to be
>roughly equivalent in its causal powers to an automaton wholly bereft of
>conscious intentional agency.  Schopenhauer would disagree, but let's
>ignore him for the time being.  On abduction, see the anthology [Eco and
>Sebeok, ed.  1983], in particular the papers by Umberto Eco and Carlo
>Ginzburg.} However, in justly concluding that your symptoms of fever,
>catarrh, and prostration {\it naturally mean} that you are afflicted with a
>case of influenza, you are not justified in regarding your symptoms as a
>{\it non-natural} sign thereof, possessed of an {\it expressive}
>meaning.\footnote{On the typology of symptoms as signs, as well as the
>distinction between {\it observation} of signals originating from an
>inanimate source, and {\it diagnostics} of signals from an animate emitter
>of signs, see [N\"oth 1990]: 114, 170.} Likewise, in observing the sky and
>remarking that it looks like rain, you would be justified in interpreting
>the nimbus cloud as a natural, but not an expressive sign of impending
>precipitation.

CO:
  Why are we ignoring Schopenhauer?  
  Also, this gruesome story about the poor guy certainly helps bring
forth the distinction you are seeking--although, if I may, your ending
with the sky is somewhat anticlimatic. :-) Perhaps something
along the line of, "Distressed, our Hero went outside to check the weather.
Ignoring the usual interpretation of loud thunder as a sign for impending
lightening, our hero was struck and died."  En tout cas, c'est n'est pas mal.
(In this case, it seems that the interpretation of thunder-->lightening
STILL required an intentional agent; ie, the now dead guy...This is where I 
wonder if people get confused.  There is an intentional agent present,
but it may not be the computer; simply the guy-using-the-computer.) 

MZ:
 
>We have observed two cases of natural signs: one originating from the
>events occurring in the inanimate realm, and another originating from
>the actions of an animate being.  Clearly, we do not wish to classify
>the occurrence of a rain cloud as an instance of communication; on the
>other hand, we are accustomed to saying that the actions of the
>influenza virus communicate a particular disease.  Unlike a rain cloud,
>the virus is an agent; however the nature of its agency is purely {\it
>somatic}, sufficient for volition, but not for intention, and hence
>bereft of non-natural, semantic meaning; in other words, the
>communication effected by it is natural, rather than expressive.  Thus
>the necessary condition for an occurrence of expressive meaning is
>intentional action, which depends on {\it noetic} agency.

CO REPLY:

  Regardless of Kenneth Tolman's reply, I still believe the distinction
you are making between clouds and virii still holds.  In fact, it seems to
me, that this distinction was actually SUPPORTED by Tolman's reply?
  Further, I understand that an intensional agent must be both somatic
and noetic.

MZ:

>To recapitulate, we observe that in order for an entity to use a sign, or
>anything else, it must be an agent, and the thing used, a patient.

CO REPLY:
  
   Ok, You have lost me at this point.  Please explain the conclusion
that "in order for an entity to use a sign...it must be an agent, and...
a patient."

MZ: 

>Furthermore, the thing used becomes a sign in virtue of standing for
>something else, {\it aliquid stat pro aliquo.}, and an expressive sign, in
>virtue of a teleological association between itself and the meaning
>expressed.  Conversely, Aristotle's discussion of {\it telos}, or final
 
CO REPLY:

  If the answer is located in the above statement, please uncompact it for 
me.


MZ:

>In accordance with the above definitions, we shall strive to apprehend
>the meaning of a literary text by relating it to the intentional agency
>of its creator, and the historical significance of its constituents.

CO REPLY:
  Now this is interesting. Tell me more!

  Question Rephrased:

   It seems that your argumentation above demands a particular sort
of agent to be intensional.  Granted.  The common AI debate is that a
computer IS such an agent that can be intensional--that is, that it is
somehow both somatic and noetic.  However, it seems to me that this stance
is only maintained by virtue of the goal of "To Represent."  Is it 
sufficient to maintain that an agent is both somatic and noetic simply
by means of that agent's goal in represenation?  Further, is it possible
to maintain that an agent is both somatic and noetic simply by virtue
of that agent's patient in representation?  Finally, can it be maintained
that an agent is capable of intensionality meerly by virtue of both
goal and patient?  By "meerly" and "simply," I mean that no indication
of what that agent is is(merde) given without thinking of that agent 
solely by virtue of it's goals and patients.  It seems, further, that this
is some form of reverse-teleology(unless, of course, it is argued 
teleologically where the agent is already presumed to be of sort or another).
Thus, is a reverse-teleology possible for describing an intensional agent?

  I hope this clarifies my original question.

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charles O. Onstott, III                  P.O. Box 2386
Undergraduate in Philosophy              Stillwater, Ok  74076
Oklahoma State University                onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu

"The most abstract system of philosophy is, in its method and purpose, 
nothing more than an extremely ingenious combination of natural sounds."
                                              -- Carl G. Jung
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