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>From: tolman%asylum.utah.edu@cs.utah.edu (Kenneth Tolman)
Subject: Re: Causes and Goals (was re: The Systems Reply I
Date: 15 Mar 92 23:38:05 MST
Message-ID: <1992Mar15.233805.3026@hellgate.utah.edu>
Organization: University of Utah CS Dept
References: <1992Mar14.010014.552@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> <1992Mar15.170938.9882@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Mar16.005137.13005@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Mar16.003442.9891@husc3.harvard.edu>

In article <1992Mar16.003442.9891@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
>
>\subsection{The Semantic Role of Volition.}
>
>Having estabilished a methodology for disambiguating textual meaning,
>we shall consider the question of its relation to intentionality.
>Briefly, I shall argue that semantics without agency is simply
>inconceivable.
 [I do not think that word means what you think it means]

INCONCEIVABLE!!!!  Well, I will show you are mistaken. Information and
communication do not require agency in the sense of animate objects.


> Following H.
>P.\thinspace Grice's classic discussion, we shall distinguish between
>natural meaning of phenomena merely interpreted as signs in virtue of
>being recognized as effects of a presumed antecedent cause, and
>non-natural, or semantic meaning.\footnote{See his paper ``Meaning'',
>in [Grice 1989].}

Now THIS is a good idea.  However, why don't we consider these facets to
be caused, and uncaused, respectively. (where uncaused is understood to
be that which is not caused externally or beforehand)

>We have observed two cases of natural signs: one originating from the
>events occurring in the inanimate realm, and another originating from
>the actions of an animate being. 

Say what?  Why are you set on classifying things into animate and inanimate?
Do you care to define the division between these? It is overly simplistic,
and wrong.

MISTAKE.  The occurrence of a rain cloud as observed is communication.

>other hand, we are accustomed to saying that the actions of the
>influenza virus communicate a particular disease.  Unlike a rain cloud,
>the virus is an agent; however the nature of its agency is purely {\it

What?  How is a virus more of an agent than a rain cloud?  Your logic
defies logic.

>somatic}, sufficient for volition, but not for intention, and hence
>bereft of non-natural, semantic meaning; in other words, the
>communication effected by it is natural, rather than expressive.  Thus
>the necessary condition for an occurrence of expressive meaning is
>intentional action, which depends on {\it noetic} agency.

>To recapitulate, we observe that in order for an entity to use a sign, or
>anything else, it must be an agent, and the thing used, a patient.

I disagree.  First, what do you mean "use a sign, or anything else"?
Use anything else or what?  In order for an entity to use a sign, it need
not be an agent (unless you define agent as I do below).

>meaningfully talk of the end of a thing, i.e. that for the sake of which a
>thing is, without thereby presupposing not only somatic, but also noetic
>agency.  


Talk of the end of a thing?  There are only processes.  I won't dwell here
since it is not pertinent.

There are a couple problems with this whole thing.  For one, you seem to
like using big words which confound issues and are irrelevant.  However,
this may be an asset, so I won't discredit it.  The whole standpoint of
the ideas are coming from an incorrect conceptualization.

  Lets look at the world as having some things which are considered to
have volition.  What does this really mean?  It is operating on its own,
of its own intent. It is operating OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK of external
things, it is operating on its own.  

  Now what would be something not operating under volition?  It would be
something acting purely in the context of external things, not operating
with any whit of being on its own.

  Something operating on its own has its own volition and is an agent.
What is the minimal agent one could consider?  A good one to select
is gene modification, it operates on its own. There is no external power
dictating the way it will modify.  Specifically, normally a 260nnm photon
will activate the sugar through a nondetermined event.  The point of
mutation is outside external events.

  An agent is something that can cause an action which is independent of
external causes.  An agent is specifically...

  Hopefully you understand my poor communication, however your argument
contains some good ideas, but is essentially wrong.  It can be mended
if you accept my definition of agency.  I am not sure from what domain
you come from, but what seems to be lacking is some scientific support
of these claims you make.  Don't get me wrong, the web you weave is most
interesting, however I have been weaving on this web for a while myself.
The "Recursive Universe ##" helps explain my position.


