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Subject: Re: Causes and Goals (was re: The Systems Reply I
Message-ID: <1992Mar16.003442.9891@husc3.harvard.edu>
>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Date: 16 Mar 92 00:34:38 EST
References: <1992Mar14.010014.552@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> <1992Mar15.170938.9882@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Mar16.005137.13005@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1992Mar16.005137.13005@a.cs.okstate.edu> 
onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:

>In article <1992Mar15.170938.9882@husc3.harvard.edu>
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: 

>>In article <1992Mar14.010014.552@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
>>bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes: 

BS:
>>>  I will argue that the symbols the Room manipulates are not
>>>meaningless.  Here goes:
>>>
>>>  To say that a symbol has meaning is to say that it represents.
>>>How does a symbol come to represent?  The Functionalist answer,
>>>which I subscribe to, is that a symbol represents if it has
>>>the *function* of representing.
>>>
>>>  What, then, is a "function", and how does something come to
>>>have one?
>>>
>>>  Answer: "function" is a teleological notion.  The function of
>>>a component is the role it plays in achieving the *goal* of the
>>>system it is part of.

MZ:
>>So far, so good.  Note, however, that you might have gotten to the same
>>point without assuming "Functionalism", whatever it might be, being that
>>the teleological nature of meaning can be deduced from more or less
>>universally acceptable semantic premisses.

CO:
>  Mikhail,
>
>  I am turning over the following question to your capable hands:
>
>  Why is it that whenever the capability of the agent or "to 
>represent" is exapanded to such a degree that it encompasses things like
>computers, that the only argument presented to support that any agent, or
>special agents like-a-computer, is capable of representation is presented
>by means of the goal?
>  It seems that this form of argumenation assumes
>what it is trying to prove.  The question, in short, is "can an argumentation
>of "to represent" by means of goal alone set a foundation secure enough
>to provide specifications for what its agent should be?"

To the extent that I understand your question, I think it can be
answered by something I wrote on this subject (please pardon my TeX):

\subsection{The Semantic Role of Volition.}

Having estabilished a methodology for disambiguating textual meaning,
we shall consider the question of its relation to intentionality.
Briefly, I shall argue that semantics without agency is simply
inconceivable.

According to the traditional definition, a symbol is an iconic or a
substitutive sign, something that stands for something else, {\it
aliquid stat pro aliquo}.\footnote{See [N\"oth 1991]: 81.}  In order to
treat the literary text as a symbol, we must account for the way in
which this text can be said to mean. Following H.\thinspace
P.\thinspace Grice's classic discussion, we shall distinguish between
natural meaning of phenomena merely interpreted as signs in virtue of
being recognized as effects of a presumed antecedent cause, and
non-natural, or semantic meaning.\footnote{See his paper ``Meaning'',
in [Grice 1989].}

%Consider a man who, in the course of his morning ablutions, comes to ask
%himself the eternal question, ``Why does it hurt when I pee?''  Following
%the rules of medical diagnostic, he may conclude that the gonococcus is the
%cause of his discomfort.  In other words, he interprets the pain as a sign
%indicating the onslaught of some pesky critters, estabilishing by an
%inferential process known as {\it abduction} the likelihood of a causal
%relation between the gonococcus infection and the pain caused
%thereby.\footnote{We shall consider the bacterium to be equivalent in its
%causal powers to an automaton wholly bereft of conscious intentional
%agency.  Schopenhauer would disagree, but let's ignore him for the time
%being.  On abduction, see the anthology [Eco and Sebeok, ed.  1983], in
%particular the papers by Umberto Eco and Carlo Ginzburg.} However, in
%justly concluding that his symptoms {\it naturally mean} that he is
%afflicted with a case of gonorrhoea, our hero is not justified in regarding
%his symptoms as a {\it non-natural} sign thereof, possessed of an {\it
%expressive} meaning.\footnote{On the typology of symptoms as signs, as well
%as the distinction between {\it observation} of signals originating from an
%inanimate source, and {\it diagnostics} of signals from an animate emitter
%of signs, see [N\"oth 1990]: 114, 170.} Likewise, in observing the sky and
%remarking that it looks like rain, he would be justified in interpreting
%the nimbus cloud as a natural, but not an expressive sign of impending
%precipitation.

Suppose that you wake up in the morning with a fever, catarrh, and runny
eyes.  Following the rules of medical diagnostic, and taking into
consideration your knowledge of an epidemic going on, you may conclude that
an influenza virus is the cause of your discomfort.  In other words, you
interpret your pain and discomfort as a sign indicating, in the medical
parlance, a specific febrile zymotic disorder, caused by the onslaught of a
certain microorganisms, estabilishing by an inferential process known as
{\it abduction} the likelihood of a causal relation between the viral
infection and the pain caused thereby.\footnote{We shall consider the
virus, a non-cellular structure lacking any intrinsic metabolism, to be
roughly equivalent in its causal powers to an automaton wholly bereft of
conscious intentional agency.  Schopenhauer would disagree, but let's
ignore him for the time being.  On abduction, see the anthology [Eco and
Sebeok, ed.  1983], in particular the papers by Umberto Eco and Carlo
Ginzburg.} However, in justly concluding that your symptoms of fever,
catarrh, and prostration {\it naturally mean} that you are afflicted with a
case of influenza, you are not justified in regarding your symptoms as a
{\it non-natural} sign thereof, possessed of an {\it expressive}
meaning.\footnote{On the typology of symptoms as signs, as well as the
distinction between {\it observation} of signals originating from an
inanimate source, and {\it diagnostics} of signals from an animate emitter
of signs, see [N\"oth 1990]: 114, 170.} Likewise, in observing the sky and
remarking that it looks like rain, you would be justified in interpreting
the nimbus cloud as a natural, but not an expressive sign of impending
precipitation.
       
We have observed two cases of natural signs: one originating from the
events occurring in the inanimate realm, and another originating from
the actions of an animate being.  Clearly, we do not wish to classify
the occurrence of a rain cloud as an instance of communication; on the
other hand, we are accustomed to saying that the actions of the
influenza virus communicate a particular disease.  Unlike a rain cloud,
the virus is an agent; however the nature of its agency is purely {\it
somatic}, sufficient for volition, but not for intention, and hence
bereft of non-natural, semantic meaning; in other words, the
communication effected by it is natural, rather than expressive.  Thus
the necessary condition for an occurrence of expressive meaning is
intentional action, which depends on {\it noetic} agency.

To recapitulate, we observe that in order for an entity to use a sign, or
anything else, it must be an agent, and the thing used, a patient.
Furthermore, the thing used becomes a sign in virtue of standing for
something else, {\it aliquid stat pro aliquo.}, and an expressive sign, in
virtue of a teleological association between itself and the meaning
expressed.  Conversely, Aristotle's discussion of {\it telos}, or final
cause,\footnote{See, e.g., the {\sl Metaphysics} Book $\Delta 2$, 1013b.}
makes it depend on agency; indeed, it would seem that no one could
meaningfully talk of the end of a thing, i.e. that for the sake of which a
thing is, without thereby presupposing not only somatic, but also noetic
agency.  Hence a necessary and sufficient condition for regarding a given
phenomenon as an expressive sign is determining its production as occurring
through intentional, noetic agency.

Summarizing, we recast Grice's account into a Fregean Platonist mold,
stipulating that non-natural, or semantic meaning has the following
properties:

\I Saying that an agent $A$ meant the proposition $p$ by the sentence
$s$ is equivalent to saying that $A$ intended the utterance of $s$ to
produce a specifiable effect with the propositional content $p$ in his
audience by means of their recognition of his intention in the context
of $s$.  The propositional content $p$ can be uniquely associated with
the equivalence class of sentence-tokens synonymous with $s$ in the
contexts of their utterance, as determined by the semantic conventions
of the language employed by $A$.\footnote{The claim that the
propositional content p can be uniquely associated with the equivalence
class of sentence-tokens synonymous with s in the contexts of their
utterance is meant to illustrate the relationship between the concept
of synonymy and the notion of a sentence expressing its propositional
content, rather than to suggest a thesis of identity.}  Note that $p$
is not necessarily open to the awareness of $A$; in other words, $A$
doesn't necessarily know what he means by $s$, as opposed to what he
intends it to convey.  He must nevertheless commit himself to the
objective meaning of his utterance, which transcends his subjective
intention, and can only be determined culturally and contextually.

\II Saying that $s$ meant $p$ is equivalent to saying that there exists an
intentional causal relation between the occurrence of $s$ and an agent's
prior meaning $p$ by a type-identical utterance $s^\prime$ meaning $p$.

\III Saying that $s$ means $p$ is equivalent to saying that the occurrence
of $s$ can be causally associated with a type-identical possible utterance
of $s^\prime$ by an assumed agent meaning $p$.

In accordance with the above definitions, we shall strive to apprehend
the meaning of a literary text by relating it to the intentional agency
of its creator, and the historical significance of its constituents.
In order to communicate this meaning, the device of paraphrase must be
utilized. This does not imply any kind of reduction of the literary
text to its propositional content, which would be theoretically
unsound. Indeed, as noted above, the dramatic structure of the
discourse, its quality of an {\it \'ev\'enement}  wholly ignored under
paraphrase, contributes a great deal to its effect on the
recipient.\footnote{See [Brooks 1947] for a discussion of ``the heresy
of paraphrase''.} Therefore this dramatic effect must always be seen as
bearing on any understanding of the textual meaning we might attain
through paraphrase.

________________________________________________________________________

Hope that this explains it.

>  Charles O. Onstott, III

`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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