From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!psinntp!scylla!daryl Tue Mar 24 09:55:42 EST 1992
Article 4454 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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>From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Mar14.125006.8129@oracorp.com>
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 1992 12:50:06 GMT
Lines: 28

michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>>Right off the bat, Searle gets it wrong: no AI proponent believes that
>>a computer (however programmed) is a mind.

>This is contrary to everything that *I* have heard or read, and is
>certainly opposed to the general tenor of discussion in this group.
>Any AI types care to comment?

I can't believe that it is contrary to *everything* you have read. The
whole point of the Systems Reply, that there can be more than one mind
with a single brain, just like there can be more than one program
running on a single computer. If people try to make such an
identification at all, they will say that brain corresponds to
computer, and mind corresponds to process, or running program.

To say that the mind is a brain is like saying that a sound wave is
air. Sound is a *pattern* that requires a medium such as air, but
sound is *not* air. I will admit that people say things like "The mind
is the brain", (Dennett says this in _Consciousness Explained_) but I
believe that they are being a little sloppy when they say it. The main
point of such statements is to stress materialism: a material brain
(or computer) is *sufficient* to produce a mind; there is no need for
special "mindstuff".

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY


