From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Mar 24 09:54:57 EST 1992
Article 4398 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> <SMAILL.92Mar9215108@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk>
Message-ID: <1992Mar11.184710.8512@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 1992 18:47:10 GMT

In article <SMAILL.92Mar9215108@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk> smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill) writes:
>In article <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>   Yes, I *do* believe that I have special access to my understanding, or
>   at least to my *beliefs* about my understanding.  I *know* when I believe
>   I understand Chinese.  I may be wrong that I in fact *do* understand it,
>   but, unlike any other person, I cannot be wrong about my *belief* that
>   I understand it.  I *do* stand in a privileged position with regard to
>   my mental states.  (Otherwise, to use a favorite example, we'd need a doctor
>   to tell us whether we were in pain or not.)
>
>   If you wish to deny an individual privileged access to their mental states,
>   fine, but it's going to take a *lot* of argument. 
>
>Well, I don't deny that the individual has access to his/her own mental
>states in a different way than they have access to the mental states of
>others.  What is problematic is the claim that the individual is
>necessarily correct in evaluating their own mental states.
>(By the way, I assume you agree that statements like "I am in pain"
>are somewhat different from "I understand Chinese", in that
>the former might be taken to be basic, primitive judgement.)

I agree that judgements of pain are *different* than judgements of
understanding.  But the process of understanding English for me seems to
be very automatic and "basic".  (Do I take it that you agree a person
cannot be wrong about believing they are in pain?)

>So, what happened to the sub-conscious?  to repression of beliefs?
>Is it not possible to deceive oneself as to what one really believes?
>Is it not a problem if I believe I believe X, yet my actions
>only make sense assuming I really believe not X?  

In the above instance I assumed we were talking about the content of
*conscious* mental states.  Depending on how they are characterized, it
may very well be possible to have a conscious belief which conflicts
with an unconscious belief.  My concerns above are with the possibility
of being wrong about what you *consciously* believe.  I may be wrong in
attributing my actions to belief X, but if I am conscious of believing
X, I would assert that I cannot be wrong about believing that I consciously
believe X.

- michael



