From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Mar 24 09:54:56 EST 1992
Article 4397 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Mar9.201433.26909@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu>
Message-ID: <1992Mar11.183207.6464@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 1992 18:32:07 GMT

In article <1992Mar9.201433.26909@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu> bill@NSMA.AriZonA.EdU (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>In article <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> 
>michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>
>>Yes, I *do* believe that I have special access to my understanding, or
>>at least to my *beliefs* about my understanding.  I *know* when I believe
>>I understand Chinese.  I may be wrong that I in fact *do* understand it,
>>but, unlike any other person, I cannot be wrong about my *belief* that
>>I understand it.  I *do* stand in a privileged position with regard to
>>my mental states.  (Otherwise, to use a favorite example, we'd need a doctor
>>to tell us whether we were in pain or not.)
>>
>>If you wish to deny an individual privileged access to their mental states,
>>fine, but it's going to take a *lot* of argument. 
>>
>  Let us consider what it means to believe something.
>
>  Much of what we call thinking consists of internal conversations
>we conduct with ourselves.  We silently "say" things and then
>contemplate them.  "Believing" something means saying to oneself
>that it is true.  "Knowing that one believes" something means
>hearing one say to oneself that it is true.
>
>  Can one, then, believe something without knowing one believes
>it?  Normally not, because if one's mind is functioning correctly,
>one's internal conversations are clear and comprehensible.  But
>it is at least possible in principle, and may actually happen in
>disordered states such as schizophrenia, where language is so
>fractured that victims may not be able to conduct coherent internal
>conversations with themselves.  

I don't know the specifics of schizophrenia, but I am uncomfortable about
talking in terms of "internal conversations", as I don't think this is 
the way beliefs work.

>  I do not deny that individuals have privileged access to their
>mental states.  After all, they are the only ones who can hear
>their internal conversations.  I do, though, claim that the
>provilege is not absolute.  It *is* possible, though very unusual,
>to be wrong about what one believes.

I don't see how you've show this from the above.  If you could expand
on it, I'd appreciate it.  

>(Note:  There are other ways to analyze the concept of belief, but
>I think the one I have given is closest to common usage.  If you
>prefer a different analysis, please be explicit about it.  However
>you analyze it, I will defend the claim that either i) belief is
>trivial (i.e. if saying something means believing it); or ii) belief
>does not occur in humans (i.e. if it requires infinite recursion);
>or iii) it is possible to be wrong about what one believes.)

I certainly am no expert in belief or belief-fixation, and I am happy
to learn about alternative approaches.  The line I am pursuing
above is simply my own cogitation on what I mean by belief.

- michael


