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Article 4390 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <6375@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 10 Mar 92 20:08:42 GMT
References: <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu> <SMAILL.92Mar9215108@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk>
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In article <SMAILL.92Mar9215108@sin.aisb.ed.ac.uk> smaill@aisb.ed.ac.uk (Alan Smaill) writes:

>Is it not a problem if I believe I believe X, yet my actions
>only make sense assuming I really believe not X?  

What does this mean?  Are you suggesting that no one could believe
X and yet act like they believe not-X?


