From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!news.cs.indiana.edu!att!linac!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!think.com!ames!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!jvnc.n Tue Mar 24 09:54:31 EST 1992
Article 4364 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!news.cs.indiana.edu!att!linac!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!think.com!ames!haven.umd.edu!darwin.sura.net!jvnc.n
et!nuscc!hilbert!smoliar
>From: smoliar@hilbert.iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Mar9.224730.13092@nuscc.nus.sg>
Date: 9 Mar 92 22:47:30 GMT
References: <31046@samsung.samsung.com> <1992Mar7.124019.1529@memstvx1.memst.edu>
Sender: usenet@nuscc.nus.sg
Reply-To: smoliar@iss.nus.sg (stephen smoliar)
Organization: Institute of Systems Science, NUS, Singapore
Lines: 47

In article <1992Mar7.124019.1529@memstvx1.memst.edu>
langston@memstvx1.memst.edu writes:
>
>  I think I missed Minsky's full idea of context-dependent understanding, but
>upon re-reading the msg, I see that now...
>  But, withing any one domain, there are many types of knowledge (causal,
>sensory,
>procedural, taxonomic-definitional, etc.), and these types of knowledge
>correspond to different levels of 'understanding' a concept within any
>domain.  My argument is that someone who posesses only one of these types of
>kknowledge (or only the shallow e.g, taxonomic-definitional or procedural)
>does not have very much 'understanding' of the domain.  

I think this misses the point I was trying to make.  I basically agree that
there are different "types of knowledge" (I am not sure that is what I would
want to call them);  but they reside in EACH DIFFERENT CONTEXT in which
"understanding" may be exhibited.  In other words a music theorists is
just as likely to invoke that "full spectrum of knowledge types" as is
a performer;  but because the individuals have different goals, they have
different knowledge which is put to use in different ways.  It is thus as
pointless to claim that the theorist "'understands' more" than the performer
as it is to claim that an apple is "more of a fruit" than an orange.

Let me try another example which comes back to Searle's favorite theme of
understanding Chinese.  I now live in a country where English, Mandarin,
Malay, and Tamil are all used quite extensively.  Mandarin is still a great
mystery to me;  so I would probably make a good surrogate for Searle when he
wishes to state A PRIORI that he does not understand Chinese.  Nevertheless,
there are certain situations (highly limited, of course) in which I am obliged
to function through interaction with Mandarin speakers.  These include ordering
at food stalls and getting cabs to go where I need to go.  If you want to
survive here, you pick up those skills pretty quickly.  My guess is that,
were Searle to see me in action in one of those contexts, he might initially
hypothesize that I DID understand Chinese!

My point is that the original Chinese Room scenario is too general to be of
much use.  On the other hand the same may be said of the Imitation Game.  If
Searle's objective was to illustrate the shortcomings of the Imitation Game,
then, in many respects, the Chinese Room constitutes a good REDUCTIO AD
ABSURDUM.  Ironically, the consequence of the position he took is that
support for the Imitation Game seems to have increased, ultimately distracting
one from recalling that even Turing recognized its limitations.
-- 
Stephen W. Smoliar; Institute of Systems Science
National University of Singapore; Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Kent Ridge, SINGAPORE 0511
Internet:  smoliar@iss.nus.sg


