From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Mar 24 09:54:21 EST 1992
Article 4352 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar6.185522.18137@oracorp.com>
Message-ID: <1992Mar9.163303.2313@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 1992 16:33:03 GMT

In article <1992Mar6.185522.18137@oracorp.com> daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:

>What exactly is the hypothesis that Searle is trying to disprove by
>the Chinese Room argument? He states it as follows: "...according to
>Strong AI...the appropriately programmed computer really *is* a
>mind...". [From "Minds, Brains, and Programs", reprinted in _The
>Nature of Mind_, edited by David Rosenthal] 
>
>Right off the bat, Searle gets it wrong: no AI proponent believes that
>a computer (however programmed) is a mind.

This is contrary to everything that *I* have heard or read, and is certainly
opposed to the general tenor of discussion in this group.  Any AI types care
to comment? 


- michael




