From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Mar 24 09:54:20 EST 1992
Article 4351 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Mar6.172308.15113@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar6.223154.26703@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu>
Message-ID: <1992Mar9.162941.1959@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 1992 16:29:41 GMT

In article <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu> pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis) writes:
>In article <1992Mar6.223154.26703@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>>> What does syntax say you should do
>>>with queries where the referrent is not external ?
>>
>>Good question.    
>
>Glad you agree. Here's one (quickly cooked up) answer: there is
>nothing internal. To the mechanisms that generate speech, everything,
>including a mind, is external.

Huh?  

>>I refuse to make this last suggested move, as it seems to deny the 
>>possibility that others could be *wrong* about my understanding.  There
>>certainly *is* something special about the access I have to *my*    
>>understanding, something that I don't have when examining others understanding.
>>To argue against this is to retreat into behaviourism.  
>
>Why could they not be wrong ? Why do you believe that you have special
>access to your understanding ? Do you have special access to your
>neuronal function ? Do you have special access to your memory
>mechanisms ? Why do you believe that you have special access instead
>of believing that you *are* the access ? I don't believe Skinner would
>see this as Behaviourism.

Yes, I *do* believe that I have special access to my understanding, or
at least to my *beliefs* about my understanding.  I *know* when I believe
I understand Chinese.  I may be wrong that I in fact *do* understand it,
but, unlike any other person, I cannot be wrong about my *belief* that
I understand it.  I *do* stand in a privileged position with regard to
my mental states.  (Otherwise, to use a favorite example, we'd need a doctor
to tell us whether we were in pain or not.)

If you wish to deny an individual privileged access to their mental states,
fine, but it's going to take a *lot* of argument. 


- michael



