From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!sarah!cook!psinntp!psinntp!scylla!daryl Mon Mar  9 18:36:01 EST 1992
Article 4336 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
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>From: daryl@oracorp.com (Daryl McCullough)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Mar6.185522.18137@oracorp.com>
Organization: ORA Corporation
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 1992 18:55:22 GMT

christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

> [Summary of the Chinese Room thought experiment, with
>  the man memorizing the rules]
> At this point, Hofstadter and Dennett, or at least the charicatures
> of them that have been inhabiting this discussion of late, want to
> claim that he understands Chinese, only unconsciously? Why suddenly
> unconscious? For no reason at all except that such understanding,
> if it exists at all, is patently not in the man's consciousness.

Chris, there is a fundamental misunderstanding at work here, as there
was in all of Searle's papers about the Chinese Room, as well. In
producing this reductio ad absurdum, Searle combined bits and pieces
of the Systems Reply with bits and pieces of his own beliefs, and came
up with an absurdity. No kidding!

What exactly is the hypothesis that Searle is trying to disprove by
the Chinese Room argument? He states it as follows: "...according to
Strong AI...the appropriately programmed computer really *is* a
mind...". [From "Minds, Brains, and Programs", reprinted in _The
Nature of Mind_, edited by David Rosenthal] 

Right off the bat, Searle gets it wrong: no AI proponent believes that
a computer (however programmed) is a mind. The claim of
computationalists is not that the mind is a computer, but that the
*brain* is a computer (among other things). So where does a mind come in?
That's another posting.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY


