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Article 4335 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Mar7.010644.1466@beaver.cs.washington.edu>
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Organization: Computer Science & Engineering, U. of Washington, Seattle
References: <1992Mar5.203720.4209@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Mar6.172308.15113@beaver.cs.washington.edu> <1992Mar6.223154.26703@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Sat, 7 Mar 92 01:06:44 GMT

In article <1992Mar6.223154.26703@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <1992Mar6.172308.15113@beaver.cs.washington.edu> pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis) writes:
>>In article <1992Mar5.203720.4209@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>>Searle's contribution is in how such a thing can *not* exist, namely, by
>>>the purely syntactic manipulation of symbols.
>>
>>I can't disagree with that. However, Searle went a little further with
>>the Chinese room by allowing the questioner to ask questions of the
>>form "Do you ... ?" I don't know of anyone who has claimed that purely
>>syntactic manipulation of a given set of symbols could ever provide an
>>answer to questions of this form.
>
>Anyone who has ever claimed that Strong AI could succeed has implicitly
>made this claim, since Strong AI claims that minds can be produced through
>the manipulation of marks in a purely syntactic fashion.



>> What does syntax say you should do
>>with queries where the referrent is not external ?
>
>Good question.    

Glad you agree. Here's one (quickly cooked up) answer: there is
nothing internal. To the mechanisms that generate speech, everything,
including a mind, is external.

>>If Searle's "memorizer" man was to represent his own shuffling the way
>>that your or I represent our own brain activity, I strongly believe he
>>would answer, with conviction, "yes" when asked if he understood
>>Chinese. If you could see "understand" as a term that you apply as a
>>description rather than as an experience, whether or not the object is
>>"you" or someone else, this might be clearer.
>
>I refuse to make this last suggested move, as it seems to deny the 
>possibility that others could be *wrong* about my understanding.  There
>certainly *is* something special about the access I have to *my*    
>understanding, something that I don't have when examining others understanding.
>To argue against this is to retreat into behaviourism.  

Why could they not be wrong ? Why do you believe that you have special
access to your understanding ? Do you have special access to your
neuronal function ? Do you have special access to your memory
mechanisms ? Why do you believe that you have special access instead
of believing that you *are* the access ? I don't believe Skinner would
see this as Behaviourism.

-- paul




-- 
Computer Science Laboratory	  "truth is out of style" - MC 900ft Jesus
University of Washington 		<pauld@cs.washington.edu>


