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Article 4223 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <13555@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: 3 Mar 92 18:39:57 GMT
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In article  <465@tdatirv.UUCP> Stanley Friesen writes:
]In article <1992Feb29.133816.9316@husc3.harvard.edu> zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:
]
]|First, Searle's argument constitutes a legitimate attempt to formulate an
]|a priori claim that your enterprise is flawed in principle;
]
]Which has failed because it *is* a priori, and in general I do not accept
]a priori arguments unless they are *fully* based on verifiable facts.

If by "verifiable", you mean "empirically verifiable", then an
argument based on verifiable facts cannot be a priori.  The term "a
priori" means "prior to any emprical observations".  Since all
mathematical proofs are arguments a priori, your statement amounts to
denying all of mathematics.  I don't think you really meant that did
you (see below before you answer)?  What you probably mean is that you
think some of Searle's premises are matters of empirical observation
and are therefore not really a priori.  If so, which premises do you
have in mind?

]| while the
]|attempts to refute Searle on philosophical grounds have all failed so far.
]
]But I *am* addressing it on a 'philosophical' ground.  I am saying that his
]premises lack observational validity, and must be verified before being used
]in any argument, at least if ti is to be conclusive.

If you are to be consistent, then you must also deny all of
mathematics until it is empirically verified.  That is, you don't know
that 1000 + 1000 = 2000 until you have tried it out in a lot of
different circumstances, with lots of different types and mixes of
objects.  And if you ever get a mis-count, you will have to give a
statistical uncertainty to the final result.  Of course, the
calculation of the statistical uncertainty depends on beliefs that are
a priori...

Unless you are willing to take this anti-rational approach and deny
the validity of a priori reasoning altogether, you cannot refute
Searle just by demanding empirical evidence.  By the very fact that
Searle has given an argument a priori, he limits your rational
response to arguments a priori (which is what I think Mikhail was
getting at).  You must find fault with either his premises or his
deductions.  _One_ way of faulting a premise is to argue that it is a
matter of observation.  But to do that you have to identify the
particular premise, show that it _is_ a premise, and show how a denial
of the premise does not lead to a contradiction.

By the way, I don't agree with Mikhail that AI research should be
terminated.
--
					David Gudeman
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
noao!arizona!gudeman


