From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!cs.utexas.edu!convex!constellation!a.cs.okstate.edu!onstott Mon Mar  9 18:34:18 EST 1992
Article 4175 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!cs.utexas.edu!convex!constellation!a.cs.okstate.edu!onstott
>From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
References: <1992Feb28.013430.15621@ccu.umanitoba.ca> <1992Feb29.002301.8724@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Feb29.083155.10877@ccu.umanitoba.ca>
Message-ID: <1992Mar1.073946.26151@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: Oklahoma State University, Computer Science, Stillwater
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 92 07:39:46 GMT
Lines: 89

In article <1992Feb29.083155.10877@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:
>In article <1992Feb29.002301.8724@a.cs.okstate.edu> onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
>>In article <1992Feb28.013430.15621@ccu.umanitoba.ca> zirdum@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Antun Zirdum) writes:
>>>
>>>I am not calling anything into question, I deny my freedom of the
>>>*will*! It may seem to me that I am free to choose position A over
>>>position B, but in the overall scheme of things my choice has
>>>been determined by outside influences (over which I have no control!)
>>>If the outside influence had been different I *would* have chosen
>>>the opposite!
>>  So, your responses to me, the language that you use, the thoughts that
>>you have, the way you do things, are all determined? 
>>>
>>>I have a question for you, If indeed you have freedom of will, in
>>>what form does it manifest itself in! Is it like a coin toss,
>>>completely random. In that case how does it make you free?
>>>No, all decisions are produced by influences that have nothing
>>>to do with freedom!
>>  By coin tosses I suppose you are making an allusion to the quantum
>>randomness argument.  Some people use this argument to claim that 
>>freedom-of-the-will exists; however this actually proves quite the 
>>opposite.  After all, a thing that is random can not be controled--
>>which is the point you are making, and a point that should be understood.
>>I actually adhere more to a freedom of the will notion presented by
>>Erich Fromm which holds that the freedom of will occurs at the outset
>
>Fromm, Sorry I could not look him up. I guess I have been exposed to
>the wrong school of philosophy. (half seriously) I do believe that
>your freedom of the will does not preclude determinism. It is simply
>different from freedom-determinism, and I do not deny that an
>individual has to make choices (be that individual a man/animal/machine
>it simply must make those choices on the available data. So, yes
>you must make choices - you have no other choice!
>For once I find myself in agreement with you, if only you would
>not use words such as freedom of will (since these words are loaded
>for me to mean opposite of determinism-of-will) The fact that the
   I will use "volition" instead.  Hopefully this does not carry the
   connotation which bothers you.
>individual has chosen on the basis of evidence, does not in any way
>imply that the outcome of his choice is not determined.
>(Suffice it to say, I do understand this position you are getting at.
>I have studied existentialism-et-al, but it is completely different
>(as in 'no relation to') the current discussion freedom/determinism.
>Perhaps we should say that your type of freedom-of-will is a WEAK
>freedom, while I am talking of a STRONG freedom!
    Yes, this is a form of WEAK freedom.  I am clueless, however, as to
why you find this not related to the currect discussion?
>
>What causes you to say that meaning is somehow interwined with
>freedom/determinism? (I have heard this before from others, but am
>really puzzled by this statement.)
>>
  Meaning requires volition becuase meaning implies an intention to understand.
When one thinks of "intensional" agents, etc, the play on words should be 
played.  Not only does "intensional" refer to the "meaning"(Sinn/Bedeutung,
ect) but also to the notion that the agent "intends" to make the meaning
connect.  Intending implies a freedom of some sort.  If there were no such
thing as freedom, as it now appears you do *not* maintatin, then everything
will proceed in the way that it does regardless of anything.  In this case,
then, meaning looses its meaning(heh) because meaning requires that the
statement be meaningful(shit).  Ok, lets start over, the idea of meaning
requires that whatever is passed meaningfully has an impact that can
determine certain outcomes within a range of possible outcomes.  By "impact
that can determine" I emphasise "CAN" because it may not determine anything--
after all I can say "Don't reply to this" and you could.  The meaning of 
"don't" comes from the word itself plus the actions intended to be
taken--don't could be intrepreted as interruptive because you wanted to
reply; or as permissive because you did not want to reply or as passive
because you don't care one way or the other about the statement as you are 
going to do what you *want* to do.  If things just proceed without any 
"language" being capable of altering behavior then it can be considered
to be meaningless as the behavior would be the same regardless of what
was said.

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Charles O. Onstott, III                  P.O. Box 2386
Undergraduate in Philosophy              Stillwater, Ok  74076

Oklahoma State University                onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu


"The most abstract system of philosophy is, in its method and purpose, 
nothing more than an extremely ingenious combination of natural sounds."
                                              -- Carl G. Jung
-----------------------------------------------------------------------


