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Article 6123 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: sharder@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Soren Harder)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Cartesian Theater & You (here)
Message-ID: <9680@scott.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 5 Jun 92 21:40:55 GMT
References: <9206032321.AA05321@CSUFresno.EDU>
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK
Lines: 92

rhorowit@ZIMMER.CSUFRESNO.EDU (Rick Horowitz) writes:

>Caveat: Undergrad philosophy student

>It seems that everyone is busy trying to eliminate, in
>one way or another, some Cartesian view of the mind/brain.

One of the reasons it is coming up right now is Daniel Dennetts book
'Consciousness explained' that appeared some months ago.

>However, at the same time, it doesn't seem like you (and
>I mean ALL of you) can do this; you all seem to be--"deep
>down"--Cartesians.  

It's hard to avoid when we are brought up (academically) as we are.
But we try to avoid it. (some of us at least).

>>Just assume for now that most people felt this way.  The purpose of the
>>TT and TTT might then be to identify AI entities that _feel_ as if they
>								    ^^^^
>>are something that possesses consciousness, that someone is home, the

>Excuse me?  Could you explain in what sense "they" could feel anything
>about "themselves" without having this same difficulty with an apparent
>           ^^^^^^
>Cartesianism? 

I think (with Dennett) that it is fool-hardy to deny that there is
something that gives us the impression that we are possessing
consciousness. There is something it is to be me; something that only
I know. But this does not mean we have to explain these phenomena by
referring to unanalysable 'feelings' and homunculi.

>What would be wrong with some kind of emergentism, in which the mind
>("looking" something like a Cartesian ego sitting back in the third
>or fourth row, watching the show put on by "its" inputs) was 
>ineliminable?  

Whats wrong? How would you account for the mind of the X that is
sitting in the Cartesian Theatre. Does (s)he/it have his own Cartesian
Theatre inside its head. You have to explain somehow how some
processes that a mechanical (un-conscious) can produce the conscious mind.

>  Just because we can make a 
>distinction between an appearance and some underlying "reality", 
>does this mean the appearance is "not-real"?  

No it is still real. It is a real appearance. Dennett suggests that we
use a methodology he calls 'heterophenomenology'. It is very much like
methods used in anthropology and literary science. You take what you
hear or read as true to begin with, and try to explain how the system
of beliefs (the story) can be explained both from within, how it has
its own internal consistency, and from without what are the social and
physical (neurological etc.) phenomena that creates this system of beliefs.


>Appearances definitely seem to be real--at least as real as the
>computer I'm "writing" this on, or the table that holds up that
>computer.  But, wait, the computer is, after all, only a collocation
>of some molecules, and the table?--ditto.  Does this mean the
>computer isn't real? the table isn't real?  Just because I might
>(want to) say "Something resembling a Cartesian ego sitting in the
>third or fourth row of the theater of my mind turns out to be 
>[fill in this spot with whatever we decide it turns out to be]"--
>does this mean it isn't real?  

I think it is important here to distinguish between the 'real'
appearances the qualia; the things we feel because we are humans:
pain, consciousness etc. and the social induced beliefs. I believe the
Cartesian Theatre is of the last type, it is a product of
theoritizing, not of 'being-in-the-world'.

>If I explain that my computer is,
>after all, just a collection of molecules of this or that type
>(whatever THAT means), have I explained away my computer?  Have I
>"reduced" my computer to non-computerness?

>What I'd like to know is---and I know your lights are on---if
>there really ain't nobody home, how can I (who is home!) ever
>expect a response to the above???  (Oh, woe is _________ ME, I guess.)

There are someone home. But not a 'real me' confined to some corner of
the brain. It is a consciousness that is appearing from the working of
the whole brain in the whole of the body in the world. 

Soren Harder

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Soren Harder, (MSc student)
Centre for Cognitive Science, 2 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh
E-mail: sharder@cogsci.ed.ac.uk
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^


