From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!sdd.hp.com!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!usenet.ucs.indiana.edu!silver.ucs.indiana.edu!cshertze Thu Jul  9 16:20:41 EDT 1992
Article 6435 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!sdd.hp.com!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!usenet.ucs.indiana.edu!silver.ucs.indiana.edu!cshertze
>From: cshertze@silver.ucs.indiana.edu (Candace Shertzer)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: 1992 Cog. Sci. Conf. - Short Program
Message-ID: <Br4xA9.HFo@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 9 Jul 92 18:42:09 GMT
Sender: news@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu (USENET News System)
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 341
Nntp-Posting-Host: silver.ucs.indiana.edu



                     The Fourteenth Annual Conference of
                        The Cognitive Science Society
                          July 29 -- August 1, 1992
                              Indiana University
 
                                Short Program
                   (Full Program available upon request)
 
Wednesday July 29, 1992
 
   2:00-7:00 p.m.   REGISTRATION

   5:30-7:00        WELCOMING RECEPTION

   7:00-8:15        PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     John Holland, University of Michigan and
                     Santa Fe Institute
                      Must learning precede cognition?
 
Thursday July 30, 1992
 
   9:00-10:15 a.m.  PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     Daniel Dennett, Tufts University
                      Problems with some models of consciousness

   10:50-12:30      SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Computational models of evolution as tools for 
                     cognitive science
                    ORGANIZER:  
                     Richard Belew, UC, San Diego
                    PARTICIPANTS:  
                     Richard Belew, UC, San Diego 
                     Daniel Dennett, Tufts Univ. 
                     Merlin Donald, Queens Univ.  
                     John Holland, Univ. of Michigan and Santa Fe Inst.
                    ABSTRACT:  
   The general theme to be pursued by our panel is an analogy: 
     Neural Nets  :  Learning  ::  Genetic Algorithms  :  Evolution
That is, from the perspective of computational tools for cognitive science,
GAs can potentially play a role like that now played by NNets.  Of course,
this analogy is a truism, obviously false, and just about everything else
in between, so discussion should be lively.  Some of the more specific 
topics that are likely to be touched upon include:
 - Adapationism:  GA's are typically cast as function optimizers; doesn't
    that mean they embody Panglossian misconceptions as they are used
    as models of cognitive systems?
 - Is the recently renewed interest in evolutionary constraints on
    cognition part of the recent movement (by some) away from
    symbolic accounts of cognition and towards "neo-cybernetic" ones,
    or are evolutionary considerations orthogonal to these issues?
 - Are there really any fundamental differences between the kinds of
    computation we call "evolutionary" and those we call "learning"?
    That is, do these names simply reflect the original inspiration
    behind two successful classes of adaptive algorithms, which can
    be shown to really be interchangeable forms of machine learning?
 The panel will begin with short position statements by each of the 
participants, followed by discussion among them.  Questions from the 
audience will also be solicited.
 
   10:50-12:30       SUBMITTED TALKS:  
                      22 talks in the areas of  planning, connectionist 
                      models, development, psycholinguistics, and imagery 
                      and visual reasoning
 
   2:00-3:40        SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Similarity and representation in early cognitive 
                     development
                    ORGANIZER:  
                     Mary Jo Rattermann, Hampshire College
                    PARTICIPANTS AND TALK TITLES:  
                     Judy DeLoach and Don Marzolf 
                      Similarity and symbols in early development; 
                     Linda Smith and Michael Gasser 
                      Learning words and learning to selectively attend;
                     Mary Jo Rattermann 
                      Effects of relational labels on children's use of 
                      similarity; 
                     Dedre Gentner 
                      Mechanisms of re-representation in learning and 
                      development
                    ABSTRACT:  
     The role of similarity in cognitive development has often been 
characterized as that of a provider of false information, leading children 
to false inferences and incorrect conclusions, or as that of an inferior 
fallback strategy, to be used only when other more sophisticated strategies 
fail (e.g., Keil, 1989; Quine, 1969).  An alternative to this bleak view of 
the role of similarity is that, rather than being a hindrance, similarity 
can be a powerful tool for acquiring and organizing knowledge.  Indeed, 
similarity comparisons can often lead to new insights into complex
concepts and the abstraction of deeper relational structures.  This
symposium is organized around the view of similarity as a tool for 
cognitive development.  Each of the presentations provides an example
of similarity comparisons functioning as a catalyst for change and
growth in children's representational knowledge.
 
                    SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Representation:  Who needs it?
                    ORGANIZERS:  
                     Timothy van Gelder, Indiana Univ. and 
                     Beth Preston, Univ. of Georgia
                    PARTICIPANTS:  
                     Beth Preston, Univ. of Georgia 
                     Michael Turvey, Univ. of Connecticut 
                     Dan Lloyd, Trinity College
                     Randy Beer, Case Western Reserve Univ. 
                     Brian Smith, Xerox PARC
                    ABSTRACT:  
     Cognitive science is based on the idea that cognition is 
information processing, typically conceived as some kind of 
manipulation of representations.  There are however disinters within 
the discipline.  Some have argued that the neural mechanisms
underlying at least some human capacities cannot be regarded as
representational.  Others have argued that the cognizing systems
typically need representational capacities far more limited than 
standardly assumed by most people in cognitive science.  This symposium
will gather together researchers from a variety of areas who have
argued against representation in one way or another, as well as one or 
two articulate defenders of representation.  The aim is to address 
questions such as:  Does the brain make use of representations?  What
kinds of functions, if any, must use representations?  What conditions
must a structure or process satisfy to count as representation?  Is
there cognition without representation?  Can over-representing the
world be as much of a problem as under-representing it?
 
   2:00-3:40         SUBMITTED TALKS:  
                      24 talks in the areas of memory, scientific discovery, 
                      discourse, learning and reactivity, and connectionist 
                      models of language I
 
   4:15-5:30        PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     Richard Shiffrin, Indiana University 
                      Memory representation, storage and retrieval
 
   5:30             GALA BANQUET (optional) featuring Bernhard Flury,
                     Indiana University
 
 
Friday July 31, 1992
 
   9:00-10:15 a.m.  PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     Elizabeth Bates, University of California, San Diego 
                      Crosslinguistic studies of language breakdown in aphasia
 
   10:50-12:30      SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Dynamic processes in music cognition
                    ORGANIZERS:  
                     Caroline Palmer, The Ohio State University 
                     and Allen Winold, Indiana University
                    PARTICIPANTS AND TALK TITLES:  
                     Marilyn Boltz, Haverford College 
                      The generation of temporal expectancies in musical 
                      perception 
                     Jamshed Bharucha, Dartmouth College 
                      Dynamic aspects of pitch and timbre 
                     Ben Miller, Simmons College 
                     Don Scarborough, Brooklyn College 
                     and Jackie Jones, Brooklyn College 
                      Duration discrimination in meter perception 
                     Helga Winold, Indiana Univ. 
                     Esther Thelen, Indiana Univ. 
                     and Beverly Ulrich, Indiana Univ. 
                      Cognitive dynamics of cello performance:  Bowing 
                      by highly skilled cellists
                    ABSTRACT:  
     As one of the richest and most complex sources of expression among 
humans, musical behavior provides an excellent domain for study of the 
communication of structure in a system fraught with multiple meanings or 
interpretations.  Because music is a temporally defined acoustic signal, 
its understanding requires dynamic cognitive processes (those sensitive 
to change over time).  Questions such as whether dynamic processes 
underlying musical communication reflect cognitive constraints on other 
forms of human communication are the topic of this symposium.  The talks 
listed below represent the most current research across disciplines on 
the dynamic processes in music cognition, with special focus on temporally 
varying processes demanded by complex acoustic sources of information.
 
                     SYMPOSIUM:  
                      Reasoning and visual representations
                    ORGANIZER:  
                      K. Jon Barwise, Indiana University
                    PARTICIPANTS:  
                     John Etchemendy, Stanford Univ. 
                     Keith Stenning, Edinburgh Univ. 
                     and Karen Myers, SRI International
                    ABSTRACT:  
     The development of powerful computational platforms for creating 
diagrams and other forms of visual representations has led to renewed 
interest in the cognitive properties of such representations.  Why is 
it that humans find them so useful?  How is visually presented information 
integrated with information presented in other forms?  What are the logical 
properties of visual representations?  In this symposium a logician, 
psychologist, and computer scientist survey work in this area and comment 
on it from the perspective of their own work.
 
   10:50-12:30       SUBMITTED TALKS:
                      25 talks in the areas of:  vision, case-based
                      reasoning, similarity and categories, cognitive
                      neuroscience, and connectionist models of language II
 
 
   2:00-3:40        SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Dynamics in the control and coordination of action
                    ORGANIZERS:  
                     Geoffrey Bingham, Indiana University 
                     and Bruce Kay, Brown University,)
                    PARTICIPANTS AND TALK TITLES:  
                     E. Thelen and B. Kay 
                      Dynamic developments in the development of dynamics; 
                     E. Saltzman
                      Dynamics of speech production; 
                     R. Schmidt 
                      The coordination of actions between two people:  
                      Are oscillatory dynamics involved?
                    ABSTRACT:  
     Dynamics is becoming a major conceptual framework and modeling 
tool in cognitive science.  The use of dynamics in psychology originated 
largely in studies of perception and action.  The symposium will consist 
of tutorial presentations of recent progress in dynamical models of human 
action.
 
                    SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Goal-driven learning
                    ORGANIZERS:  
                     David Leake, Indiana University 
                     and Ashwin Ram, Georgia Institute of Technology
                    PARTICIPANTS AND TALK TITLES:  
                     Larry Barsalou, Univ. of Chicago 
                      Goals and tasks in category formation and learning; 
                     David Leake, Indiana University 
                      Task-driven explanation; 
                     Ryszard Michalski, George Mason Univ. 
                      Learning goals in machine learning
                     Evelyn Ng, Simon Fraser Univ. 
                      Goal orientation and the design of instruction;
                     Paul Thagard, Univ. of Waterloo 
                      Goals in analogy and problem solving;
                     Ashwin Ram, Georgia Inst. of Tech.
                      Meta-reasoning about knowledge goals for learning
                    ABSTRACT:  
     In artificial intelligence, psychology, and education, a growing body 
of research supports the view that learning is a goal-directed process.  
Experimental studies show that people with different goals process information 
differently; work in machine learning presents functional arguments for goal-
based focusing of learner effort.  The symposium brings together researchers 
from diverse research areas to discuss issues in how learning goals arise, how 
they affect learner decisions of when and what to learn, and how they guide 
the learning process.
 
   2:00-3:40         SUBMITTED TALKS: 
                      23 talks in the areas of event perception, expertise, 
                      choice, and problem solving, sentence comprehensions, 
                      analogy and metaphor, and associative learning
 
   4:15-5:30        PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     Douglas Hofstadter, Indiana University 
                      The centrality of analogy-making in human cognition
 
   7:00-8:40        POSTER SESSION I:  41 posters will be presented
 
 
Saturday August 1, 1992
 
 
   9:00-10:15 a.m.  PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     Martha Farah, Carnegie-Mellon University 
                      Is an object an object an object?  
                      Neuropsychological evidence for domain-specificity 
                      in visual object recognition
 
   10:50-12:30      SYMPOSIUM:  
                     Speech perception and spoken language processing
                    ORGANIZERS:  
                     David Pisoni, Indiana University 
                     and Robert Peterson, Indiana University
                    PARTICIPANTS AND TALK TITLES:  
                     Joanne Miller, Northeastern Univ. 
                      Phonetic categories:  Internal structure and context; 
                     Carol Fowler, Haskins Laboratories and Dartmouth College 
                      The nature of acoustic invarients for speech perception; 
                     Paul Luce, SUNY at Buffalo
                      Understanding spoken words
                    ABSTRACT:  
     The field of spoken language processing is a rich and very diverse 
area of investigation.  Topics of current interest include issues in speech 
perception, spoken word recognition and lexical access as well as a host of 
problems in language production.  In this symposium we will bring together 
a number of active researchers who will summarize the current state of 
research and theory in this area.  General themes in Cognitive Science 
will be emphasized.
 
                     SYMPOSIUM:  
                      Analogy, high-level perception, and categorization
                    ORGANIZERS:  
                      Douglas Hofstadter, Indiana University
                      and Melanie Mitchell, University of Michigan and
                      Santa Fe Institute
                    PARTICIPANTS:  
                     Melanie Mitchell, Univ. of Michigan and Santa Fe Inst., 
                     Dedre Gentner, Northwestern Univ., 
                     Robert Goldstone, Indiana Univ., 
                     Bipin Indurkhya, Boston Univ., 
                     Boicho Kokinov, New Bulgarian Univ.
                    ABSTRACT:  
     Analogy-making is a central research area in cognitive science, but there 
is no broad agreement on just what analogy-making is, what its role in thought 
is, and how it should best me modeled.  Analogy-making has been characterized 
by some as a special-purpose mode of thought used in problem-solving, driven 
by a specific problem-solving purpose.  Others characterize it very 
differently, as a type of "abstract perception" that pervades thought at 
all levels, that is most often carried out without any specific purpose, 
and that is governed by the same mental mechanisms as perceptual and
categorization processes.
    In this symposium the panel will discuss the following question:
To what extent should analogy-making be viewed as an unconscious perceptual
or categorization process, or to what extent should analogy-making be seen
as a more conscious reasoning activity?  In other words, is it meaningful
to draw a sharp distinction between recognition of members of category and
the making of analogies?  If so, where should this distinction be drawn?
And what implications does this distinction have for the construction of
models of analogy-making.
 
   10:50-12:30      SUBMITTED TALKS:
                     18 talks in the areas of Feature salience and
                     reminding, explanation, tutoring and modeling of
                     students, and foundations
 
   2:00-3:40        POSTER SESSION II:  45 posters will be presented
 
   4:15-5:30        PLENARY SPEAKER:  
                     Michael Turvey, University of Connecticut 
                      Ecological foundations of cognition.
 
   8:00             OPERA (optional) Rigoletto

=====================================

 
 
 


