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Article 3351 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Jan31.231742.7415@news.media.mit.edu>
Keywords: panpsychism
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Cc: minsky
Organization: MIT Media Laboratory
References: <1992Jan28.164410.9509@psych.toronto.edu> <21879@life.ai.mit.edu> <1992Jan31.190338.25107@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1992 23:17:42 GMT
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In article <1992Jan31.190338.25107@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <21879@life.ai.mit.edu> minsky@transit.ai.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:

>>see, what they mostly share in common is
>>_short_term_memories_about_recent_mental_states.  I don't believe that

>But the whole notion of *mental* states (as opposed to physical or
>functional states) *presumes* some sort of phenomenal component that
>might just as well be call consciousness as anything else.  Otherwise
>how do we know that they are mental, and how do we know what states
>we are talking about?  My immune system has many states, and 
>even has "memories" to an exent.  Yet I would not ascribe mental states
>to my immune system, and only use the term "memories" metaphorically
>(I know that some people, such as Dave Chalmers, might ascribe mental
>states to my immune system, but then he doesn't deny the meaningfulness
>of the term "consciousness").  It seems that to be able to even
>*talk* of recent "mental" events  requires a notion of consciousness.

Um, I should have said "partial brain states".  But I am puzzled by
your idea that *anything* "might just as well be called consciousness
as anything else.  Because I'm arguing that the things we call
consciousness seem to be connected not with any old mental functions,
but certain specific -- well, sorta specific -- kinds, namely those
involving a bit of (short-term) memory.



