From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb  5 11:55:41 EST 1992
Article 3345 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual person?)
Message-ID: <1992Jan31.211540.13945@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan30.171309.1168@memstvx1.memst.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1992 21:15:40 GMT

In article <1992Jan30.171309.1168@memstvx1.memst.edu> langston@memstvx1.memst.edu writes:
>
>  In the discussion of consciousness in this thread, are we adopting the
>'objective' view of consciousness (as I try to argue), or a more third-
>person, subjective view?  If the subjective experience is what is
>being considered here as consciousness, I would argue that this could be
>explained as an agent's (or an agent's processes) goal-directed behaviour
>regarding incoming information.

It is not at all clear to me how "goal-directed behaviour" explains
*experience*.   The notions of "agent" and "goal" *assume* the notion
of consciousness, that which is to be explained.  I think that the
above definition is a standard one when taking the "objective view"
of consciousness, but it does nothing to explain experience.

- michael





