From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor Wed Feb  5 11:55:34 EST 1992
Article 3331 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!pindor
>From: pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <1992Jan31.160635.3702@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCS Public Access
References: <12034@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1992 16:06:35 GMT

In article <12034@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
>In article  <1992Jan28.220534.1523@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> Andrzej Pindor writes:
>]In article <11979@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
>]>...Scientists verify experiments by repeating the experiment in a
>]>different place, with different subjects and different instruments.
>  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>]I am puzzled that you take my words so literally. Is it so hard to understand 
>]that what I wanted to say was that science is done by different
>]people observing 
>]the same phenomena and reaching consensus on what they observe?
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
>I presume you see the problem here?  How do you know that scientists
>are observing the same phenomena if there are different events in
>different places observed with different instruments?  Obviously, they
>have some way of deciding "what is the same as what".
>
Sure I do. However, how do you think the scientists decide that they are
observing the same phenomenon? By a purely subjective feeling 'It feels the 
same'? Or rather by observing that the phenomenon arises in similiar 
circumstances ? My introspection (:-|) tells me that such a 'feeling' is
simply a subconscious weighting of evidence and is easily influenced by 
a number of irrelevant factors (like 'I'd rather go home for dinner so I'll  
decide that I have enough evidence'). Hence reference to statistical analysis
of evidence, whenever possible, is recomended over 'the feeling'.
I am really puzzled that you attach so much certainity to introspective
conclusions. Elementary introspection (:-)) should tell you how dependent 
they are on myriad of other factors. Haven't you discovered that human ability
of deluding oneself is limitless? Only by reference to outside evidence AND
attempt at consensus with other can we have any semblance of 'certainity' 
about anything. You should know only too well that it is not only internal
factors which influence our introspective conclusions (you must have heard about
'wishful thinking') but also food we eat (e.g. alcohol), sounds we hear, smells
we smell, sights we see. I am sorry to repeat such obvious things, but your
statement about superiority of introspective conclusions over those arrived by
consensus with others is truly amazing. Of course, we may also see things
the way we want them to be, but with different people wanting to see different
things and being under influence of different factors, getting consensus is 
like averaging over random disturbances. 

>]>...  Others introspect on their own understanding.  The
>]>fact that the thinker as well as the subject is different is a
>]>methodological _advantage_, not a problem.
>]>
>]How can this be a 'methodological _advantage_' if essence of science is people
>]_agreeing_ on what they see or conclude. If everyone talks about their OWN
>]introspection, which by your definition is incommunicable to others, there is
>]no place for consensus.
>
>Obviously I am claiming that the two consciousness represent the same
>sort of phenomenon in exactly the same way that two different
>scientists observing two different masses assume that the phenomena
>are essentially the same.  Your statement that I can't communicate my
>consciousness to someone else is pure sophistry.  Scientists don't
>"communicate" the mass they observe to someone else either.  All they
>do is describe their observations and let the others make observations
>on their own mass.  The situation is entirely parallel.
>
I am afraid that your argument (and not mine) is pure sophistry. They do not
make observations on 'their own mass', but a mass (or whatever object they
are observing) which exists _independent_ of them. Sorry if it ruins your 
perception how science is done, but it may even happen, that if they suspect
that they do make observations on _different_ objects, they may exchange 
objects of their observations to make sure that these object are equivalent.
I have been myself involved in such situations.
Can I exchange my introspection with yours? So how is this situation 'entirely
parallel'? I have a feeling that you spend too much time in your office
introspecting and do not get out enough to see the real world (:-)).

>]>...you are inventing arbitrary and unfounded "rules of science" to
>]>prove your point.
>]>
>]Am I? I bet majority of people would agree that science is supposed to be
>]independent of observer's bias and requires others to agree that they all
>]observe the same thing.
>
>The arbitrariness are your claims that (1) introspection is
>necessarily more subject to bias than external observation (this is
>not merely arbitrary but logically false), and (2) that different
>observers must observe the exact same mental event to agree upon
>features of the class of events that are all considered the same
>phenomenon.  The first claim is unfounded and the second imposes a
>restriction that no science recognizes.
>
As of (1) I did not make this claim (see above), but I claim that external
observations can be compared by different observers and, by consesnsus, a lot
of bias eliminated. Not all, but there is no possibility of eliminating bias
in introspection. The second statement reflects my opinion with except for the
word 'exact'. Nothing is exactly the same in the real world. Recognizing this,
that is what science requires - that we observe the same things. Whatever
uncertainity how 'same' they are, which we may have, we carry on trying to
minimize this uncertainity. In case of introspective feelings we have no
chance of doing anything. 

>] In mathematics it means working with precise defini-
>]tions, again to make sure that everyone is talking about the same thing.
>
>OK, what are the precise definitions of "0", "a class of objects", and
>"an operation".  At some point in mathematics, you _must_ base
>everything on words that are intuitively understood.  This is as
>obvious as the need for axioms.  Seriously, don't embarass yourself by
>trying to get around this need.  There have been several attempts
>thoughout the history of mathematics and they have all failed in the
>end.  The best you can do, unless you are a genius of first magnitude,
>is to repeat the errors of your predecessors.
>
OK, I'll try not to embarass myself (I've resigned myself to the idea that I
am not a genius of first magnitude). I am fully aware (surprised ?) of the fact 
that many mathematical objects are 'intuitive'. However they are idealisations
of 'real' world objects. And mathematicians are not usually satisfied with
introspective feelings of being right, they test their conclusions by feeding
others with appropriate input and seeing if the same output (same conclusions)
comes out. So they do not seem to share your view that _nothing_ can be known
with more certainity then what is concluded by introspection alone. They do  
search for confirmation by _external_ factors.

>]>Haven't you found out that people have reached contradictory
>]>consensuses?
>]>
>]Sure, but if this was science, then the controversy was resolved by a
>]reference 
>]to an experiment(s), in case of mathematics by producing an example or a proof
>]everyone (almost) agrees upon.
>
>You have an inadequate knowledge of the history of science and
>mathematics.  There have been dozens of examples of major
>controversies that were resolved by debate with no particular
>experiment that ever proved it one way or the other.  A couple of
>striking examples are the motion of the earth around the sun and the
>evolution of species.  Both theories were agreed on because the
>scientists felt that the evidence was better explained by one theory
>than by another, but in neither case was there ever an experiment that
>proved that the competing theories were wrong.
>
It may be surprising to you but I know very well of the things you are talking 
about. Except that they confirm what I have been maintaining: the controversies
were resolved by reference to _empirical_ facts and not sterile introspection.
Empirically unresolvable problems like 'how many angels can fit on a head of
a pin' have somehow been abandoned, irrespective of introspective certainity
some 'philosophers' might have had about them.

>] If you are talking about a field where there
>]is no way, even in principle, to resolve the controversy, then this is not
>]science.
>
>I should point out that even though your assertion that introspection
>is "unscientific" is wrong, I in no way meant to imply that
>consciousness is a subject of science.  In fact my remarks are

Then we agree on at least one thing.

>specifically to the point that there is no currently known emprical
>way to observe consciousness in others, 

Here we agree again!

>                              .....and that the Turing test is
>one of the non-ways of doing so.  

I certainly never claimed that TT is a test for consciousness! Only that it is
an only way we know of testing for understanding. However unsatisfacory it
may seem, we do not have anything else, and then we use it every day to test
understanding in other humans. So you cannot possibly claim the it is totally
unfounded to use it for such a purpose.

>                          .....It is not "unscientific" to say that
>there is something that science currently has no way of knowing.
>
>]>How do you know that comparing your experience with that of others
>]>leads to more certainty in empirical observations?  The answer is that
>]
>]By experience! 
>
>How do you know that because something worked in the past that it is
>likely to work in the future?  By introspection.
>
NO! By experience! It is a matter of simple experience (I am sure yours too)
that the more times something happens, the more likely it is to happen again in
future. 

>]I have found by experience that if I rely only on my own judgement I am
>]more likely to err then when a given judgement is shared also by many other
>]people.
>
>I never denied that.  The point was that you must rely on
>introspection to have any beliefs at all.
>
Suit yourself. I try to avoid beliefs.

>]It looks to me here like you are using word introspection in a
>]slightly different sense. If you are talking about post-experimental
>]mental processing, which can be communicated to others, then I have
>
>How is it significant that the mental processing comes after an
>experiment?  (Answer: it isn't, mental processing can or cannot be
>communicated in exactly the same degree whether it comes before,
>after, or instead of an experiment.)
>
Absolutely not! Post-experimental processing is grounded in objective external
phenomena and refers to them. If you do it _instead_ of experiment, you
specifically cut yourself off independent (of your subjective bias) confirma-
tion and verification, unless you make conclusions conditional on such
verification instead of being satisfied with superior introspective certainity.
Reluctance to verify one's conclusions and deluding oneself with superiority
of introspective truths is, in all cases I have seen, a result of fear that
such verification may ruin 'beautiful' structures built on sand. And I have
seen quite a few such cases. 

>]no objection. ...But originally you were talking about introspection
>]of your subjective feelings which are incommunicable.
>
>The phrase "subjective feelings" is rhetorically loaded as you well
>know.  I am not talking about emotions or wants.  All I need to prove
>that I am conscious is to prove that I think about things.  It is not

Prove to whom? Only yourself I presume, right? I do not feel that such a proof
has any significance outside yourself (or myself if I was engaging in such
futile activity). Proving things to yourself may be good for your own 
mental condition, but unless you can prove them to others it is not science.

>at all difficult to for me to detect that I think about things, nor is
>there any chance that I might be imagining that I think about things.
>For if I imagined, then I would be thinking.  There is none of the
>vagueness or uncertainty associated with this observation that is
>normally associated with "subjective feelings".
>
>]>     ....Therefore, _nothing_ you know can be more
>]>certain than what you know by introspection alone.
>]
>]Although Mr. Zeleny objected to me calling this opinion solipsism, I believe
>]that it is not very far from it. If the above is true, why bother to do 
>]anything else but introspection?
>
>The statement "nothing you know can be more certain than what you know
>by introspection alone" in no way implies that you can know everything
>you want to know by introspection alone.
>
>]Have you seriously thought
>]about logical consequences of this statement? 
>
>Yes I have.  You obviously have not.
>
Noting '_nothing_' and 'introspection alone' in your statement above, 
does imply to me it is not worth doing things beyond introspection. But maybe
I've jumped the gun. However, somwhere above you have talked about scientists
each observing 'their own mass'. It strongly smacks of solipsism to me
(I assume you were not talking of them observing mass of their own body, were
you?).

>]>Only because you are reading into my comments what you want to see.  I
>]
>]Why should I want you to see any particular views on your part?
>
>Because if you saw my arguments as what they are, a simple assertion
>that you have no logical basis for your faith, then you would be faced
>with either giving up your faith or admiting the religious nature of
>your beliefs.  To avoid either painful consequence, you prefer either
>to make my statements into foolishness or into a different religion.
>Either way they can be safely ignored.
>
You may notice that the above cuts both ways. On my part I base my views on
what I see as presently known facts (agreed upon by a consensus of scientific
community) and I am prepared to modify them if new facts come about. On the
other hand your views on existence of things which are unverifiable from
outside do border on religion. I think I've already stated that it is not that
I 'believe' that there is no conscious (or that there is no more to understan-
ding than passing TT). I just refuse to attach any value to speculations which
are presently beyond empirical verification.

>]I do not have blind faith in the behaviorist method of detecting mental things
>](here you seem to be reading into my comments what you want to see :-(), but
>]for now I do not see any other alternative. If you convince me that there is
>]a better method, I'll only be too happy. I find the behaviorist
>]method far from]satisfactory, but I am resigned to it (for now at
>]least) since not only myself, 
>
>The fact that there is nothing better than X does not make X any
>better.  So if X was unfounded to begin with, then it is still
>unfounded.  So much is elementary.  So your comment "I am resigned to
>it" is just another way of saying that you accept it as meaningful
>even though you have no logical basis for doing so.  "Faith" is

Let me repeat: Turing type test is being used to test understanding in humans
(I am sure you are doing it yourself) so stating that 'I have no logical
basis for accepting it untill I have something better' is illogical itself. 
You may rightly claim that applied to nonhuman entities it may be
unsatisfactory. I am ready to agree but life is full of compromises.

>usually used in the sense of "belief in something with no logical
>basis", and in that sense your belief is a faith.
>
>]... So I see two alternatives: either use this defective method or shut
>]up and wait for better times. Note however that no one has even proven that
>]a better method exist, so may be nothing better is possible.
>
>Didn't I already point out the third alternative?  Simply point out
>that the method is useless (not merely defective) and admit that you
>currently have no method of detecting consiousness in others.
>
>Bob: Hey, I'm looking for a quarter I lost.
>
>Jim: Where did you lose it?
>
>Bob: It fell though that drain over there.
>
>Jim: So why are you looking for it here?
>
>Bob: Well, I couldn't get into the drain, so I thought maybe some
>miracle happened that would make it come up here where I could get to
>it.
>
You have got the story wrong. It goes like this:

Bob: Hey, I'm looking for a quarter I lost.
Jim: Where did you lose it?
Bob: Somewhere on this street.
Jim: So why are you looking only under the streetlight? I may be anywhere.
Bob: Right, but it is only here that I have a chance of finding it. It is far
     too dark anywhere else.

And that seem to summarize our views. I propose to look where we can see some-
thing and have a chance of finding anything whereas you suggest that we wander
aimlessly in the dark only because there is no guarantee that the quarter is
under the streetlight. 

>]I used the word 'soul', but we are not going to argue about a specific term,

>]are we?).
>
>There is a great difference between minds and souls.  Souls, for
>example, are immortal and presuppose at least dualism.  None of my
>comments require either immortal souls or dualism.
>--
My apologies! I've thought that you are a dualist.

>					David Gudeman
>gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
>noao!arizona!gudeman



-- 
Andrzej Pindor
University of Toronto
Computing Services
pindor@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca


