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Article 3322 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: les decrets du roi de soleil
Message-ID: <1992Jan31.003524.8293@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 31 Jan 92 05:35:22 GMT
Article-I.D.: husc3.1992Jan31.003524.8293
References: <koboi4INNa3n@exodus.Eng.Sun.COM> <DeJBFB4w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <DeJBFB4w164w@depsych.Gwinnett.COM> 
rc@depsych.Gwinnett.COM (Richard Carlson) writes:

>silber@rug.Eng.Sun.COM (Eric Silber) writes:

ES:
>> In DENOTATION, as I understand the royal decrees,
>> A is linked to B, formally under the influence of an exterior causal-relation
>> wheresas in CONNOTATION the linking function is , itself, expressing meaning.
>> The insurmountable problem of infinite recursion when traversing intensional
>> links has been propounded by H.R.H.  Why cannot this problem be dispensed wit
>> by appeal to a concept of "delayed computation" within which meanings may
>> be embedded in potentially infinite recursions, which in practice, the
>> cogitator is never called upon to carry to a conclusion?   
>> The computation always stops at a sufficient intermediate result.

RC:
>I see three possibilities if meaning really is contained in such a
>process (which it almost certainly is): 1) the chains of
>connotational links loop back on themselves, 2) they peter out in
>small and insignificant end branches, like capillaries, 3) they
>are time-limited as you suggest.

This observation has absolutely nothing to do with the question of
representational function of a sign.  To begin with, it matters not at all
whether meaning is taken to be a state, a thing, or a process, -- if your
theory quantifies over meanings, as any theory of representation must do,
they belong to its ontology, i.e. are bona fide objects.  If the semantic
hierarchy is taken to contain loops, then some objects must refer in virtue
of themselves, which is prima facie absurd; however I am willing to listen
to any materialist explanation of such alleged phenomena.  As for "petering
out", or time-limitations, they are ruled out by the direction of
ontological dependence: without an expressed meaning or a causal link,
there can be no reference, period.

RC:
>There are empirical studies that could gather evidence for these
>suspected mechanisms.  Have you ever had the experience of seeing
>"more" meaning in a passage, say a poem or a text -- not a
>_different_ "reading" in which you see the author saying something
>other than what he seemed at first to be saying, but just _more_
>meaning. That might arise when one takes or allows the time for
>the linking process to continue further than it normally would in
>the day-to-day communications we employ for practical purposes.
>But then the process seems to come to an end and to dissolve into
>meaninglessness.  (Carl Sandburg's poetry dissolves into
>meaninglessness much faster than Shakespeare's.  Does that mean
>that there was more meaning "in" Shakespeare's poetic text?)

Again, the examples have nothing to do with the question of the nature of
reference. 

>--
>Richard Carlson        |    rc@depsych.gwinnett.COM
>Midtown Medical Center |    {rutgers,ogicse,gatech}!emory!gwinnett!depsych!rc
>Atlanta, Georgia       |
>(404) 881-6877         |


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