From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Fri Jan 31 10:27:27 EST 1992
Article 3311 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <1992Jan30.205045.29216@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan29.001107.20084@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Jan29.182654.25060@aisb.ed.ac.uk> <1992Jan29.235810.11317@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1992 20:50:45 GMT

In article <1992Jan29.235810.11317@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

[a brief discussion of his view that all matter has "phenomenal consciousness",
or "qualia"]

I am a bit confused by this claim, for the following reason.  You have
stated elsewhere that, where there is information processing, there is
qualia.  You have also said in a recent posting that you felt that 
materialism, even of the functional variety, was inadequate to explain
consciousness or qualia.  Given this, why do you need to make the
"counterintuitive" claim that all matter has qualia?  If it is just
to explain how it is that humans have it, I don't see how this is any
more of an acceptable explanation than believing that it's something
special about the physical substance of the brain that yields qualia.  Each
of these "explanations" appears to be no more than a "it just *is*, OK?!"
kind of claim.  There is no reason to prefer pan-qualia-ism to a
"causal powers" view, since *neither* seem to be explanations in the
standard sense.

To clarify, my confusion is with your claim that information processing
yields qualia.  I simply don't see how this is an explanation.  

- michael
 


