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Article 3309 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <1992Jan30.194337.7949@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 30 Jan 92 19:43:37 GMT
References: <9201301911.AA17371@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 19

In article <9201301911.AA17371@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> GUNTHER@WMAVM7.VNET.IBM.COM ("Mike Gunther") writes:

>1. Anything which can feel is alive
>2. Anything which experiences qualia can feel
>3. Thermostats experience qualia
>------------
>4. Thermostats are alive.

The terms "alive" and "feel" are far too slippery for this to be a
rigorous argument.  Depending on what one means by those terms, I'll
deny 1 or 2.  If you all you mean by "feel" is possess qualia, then
I'll deny 1.  If "feeling" involves something more sophisticated
and cognitive, e.g. emotional affect, I'll deny 2 (and I might well
deny 1 as well, but that depends on just how you characterize life).

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


