From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wupost!uunet!mcsun!uknet!edcastle!cam Fri Jan 31 10:27:04 EST 1992
Article 3273 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <17193@castle.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 29 Jan 92 18:48:15 GMT
References: <1992Jan23.015152.510@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Jan23.214130.27931@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Jan26.174822.12526@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Edinburgh University
Lines: 35

In article <1992Jan26.174822.12526@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <1992Jan23.214130.27931@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>>Strong AI predicts that *if* the functional organization is right, then
>>the system will have a mind.  But given the enormous complexity of this
>>functional organization, the probability that such functional organization
>>could be realized by chance is miniscule.  Extremely miniscule. 

>As I point out to Drew McDermott, I'm not so sure that such systems *would* be
>so improbable, given the enormous number of descriptions under which a given
>physical system can be described, and the infinite possibilities for grouping  
>matter into different groups.

The complete works of Shakespeare is a large book, which can be
implemented in any technology, simply by virtue of an appropriate
encoding, and need not have the functional/causal relationships
necessary in implementing a device like a mind or a clock. It is also
vastly simpler than a human mind. Therefore the chances of the
complete works of Shakespeare being accidentally implemented by a
suitable description of the change in the pockets of the inhabitants
of China, the motes of soot floating over Iran, or whatever, is far
far greater then the chances of a mind being implemented by this sort
of accident.  In other words, if there a remote but significant
likelihood of the kind of panpsychism abhorred by Michael Gemar, we
should be able to find "accidental" copies of Shakespeare turning up
all over the place.

If, on the other hand, this panpsychism is only as likely as the
definitely real possibility of a kettle of water freezing to ice after
being put on a hot stove, then I am quite willing to call that kind of
possibility sufficiently remote to constitute effective impossibility.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205


