From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!orion.oac.uci.edu!cerritos.edu!arizona.edu!arizona!gudeman Fri Jan 31 10:27:01 EST 1992
Article 3268 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!usc!orion.oac.uci.edu!cerritos.edu!arizona.edu!arizona!gudeman
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <12034@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
>From: gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman)
Date: 29 Jan 92 21:10:47 GMT
Sender: news@cs.arizona.edu
Lines: 214

In article  <1992Jan28.220534.1523@gpu.utcs.utoronto.ca> Andrzej Pindor writes:
]In article <11979@optima.cs.arizona.edu> gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman) writes:
]>...Scientists verify experiments by repeating the experiment in a
]>different place, with different subjects and different instruments.
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
]I am puzzled that you take my words so literally. Is it so hard to understand 
]that what I wanted to say was that science is done by different
]people observing 
]the same phenomena and reaching consensus on what they observe?
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I presume you see the problem here?  How do you know that scientists
are observing the same phenomena if there are different events in
different places observed with different instruments?  Obviously, they
have some way of deciding "what is the same as what".

]>...  Others introspect on their own understanding.  The
]>fact that the thinker as well as the subject is different is a
]>methodological _advantage_, not a problem.
]>
]How can this be a 'methodological _advantage_' if essence of science is people
]_agreeing_ on what they see or conclude. If everyone talks about their OWN
]introspection, which by your definition is incommunicable to others, there is
]no place for consensus.

Obviously I am claiming that the two consciousness represent the same
sort of phenomenon in exactly the same way that two different
scientists observing two different masses assume that the phenomena
are essentially the same.  Your statement that I can't communicate my
consciousness to someone else is pure sophistry.  Scientists don't
"communicate" the mass they observe to someone else either.  All they
do is describe their observations and let the others make observations
on their own mass.  The situation is entirely parallel.

]>...you are inventing arbitrary and unfounded "rules of science" to
]>prove your point.
]>
]Am I? I bet majority of people would agree that science is supposed to be
]independent of observer's bias and requires others to agree that they all
]observe the same thing.

The arbitrariness are your claims that (1) introspection is
necessarily more subject to bias than external observation (this is
not merely arbitrary but logically false), and (2) that different
observers must observe the exact same mental event to agree upon
features of the class of events that are all considered the same
phenomenon.  The first claim is unfounded and the second imposes a
restriction that no science recognizes.

] In mathematics it means working with precise defini-
]tions, again to make sure that everyone is talking about the same thing.

OK, what are the precise definitions of "0", "a class of objects", and
"an operation".  At some point in mathematics, you _must_ base
everything on words that are intuitively understood.  This is as
obvious as the need for axioms.  Seriously, don't embarass yourself by
trying to get around this need.  There have been several attempts
thoughout the history of mathematics and they have all failed in the
end.  The best you can do, unless you are a genius of first magnitude,
is to repeat the errors of your predecessors.

]>Haven't you found out that people have reached contradictory
]>consensuses?
]>
]Sure, but if this was science, then the controversy was resolved by a
]reference 
]to an experiment(s), in case of mathematics by producing an example or a proof
]everyone (almost) agrees upon.

You have an inadequate knowledge of the history of science and
mathematics.  There have been dozens of examples of major
controversies that were resolved by debate with no particular
experiment that ever proved it one way or the other.  A couple of
striking examples are the motion of the earth around the sun and the
evolution of species.  Both theories were agreed on because the
scientists felt that the evidence was better explained by one theory
than by another, but in neither case was there ever an experiment that
proved that the competing theories were wrong.

] If you are talking about a field where there
]is no way, even in principle, to resolve the controversy, then this is not
]science.

I should point out that even though your assertion that introspection
is "unscientific" is wrong, I in no way meant to imply that
consciousness is a subject of science.  In fact my remarks are
specifically to the point that there is no currently known emprical
way to observe consciousness in others, and that the Turing test is
one of the non-ways of doing so.  It is not "unscientific" to say that
there is something that science currently has no way of knowing.

]>How do you know that comparing your experience with that of others
]>leads to more certainty in empirical observations?  The answer is that
]
]By experience! 

How do you know that because something worked in the past that it is
likely to work in the future?  By introspection.

]I have found by experience that if I rely only on my own judgement I am
]more likely to err then when a given judgement is shared also by many other
]people.

I never denied that.  The point was that you must rely on
introspection to have any beliefs at all.

]It looks to me here like you are using word introspection in a
]slightly different sense. If you are talking about post-experimental
]mental processing, which can be communicated to others, then I have

How is it significant that the mental processing comes after an
experiment?  (Answer: it isn't, mental processing can or cannot be
communicated in exactly the same degree whether it comes before,
after, or instead of an experiment.)

]no objection. ...But originally you were talking about introspection
]of your subjective feelings which are incommunicable.

The phrase "subjective feelings" is rhetorically loaded as you well
know.  I am not talking about emotions or wants.  All I need to prove
that I am conscious is to prove that I think about things.  It is not
at all difficult to for me to detect that I think about things, nor is
there any chance that I might be imagining that I think about things.
For if I imagined, then I would be thinking.  There is none of the
vagueness or uncertainty associated with this observation that is
normally associated with "subjective feelings".

]>     ....Therefore, _nothing_ you know can be more
]>certain than what you know by introspection alone.
]
]Although Mr. Zeleny objected to me calling this opinion solipsism, I believe
]that it is not very far from it. If the above is true, why bother to do 
]anything else but introspection?

The statement "nothing you know can be more certain than what you know
by introspection alone" in no way implies that you can know everything
you want to know by introspection alone.

]Have you seriously thought
]about logical consequences of this statement? 

Yes I have.  You obviously have not.

]So you think it might be possible (at least in principle) to detect
]'sef-awareness of understanding'?  You've said on another occasion
]that human understanding is semantic (as opposed to syntactic
]understanding in machines, present or imagined). So you think that
]there is a physical basis to semantics?

I remain open to the possibility.

]On the other hand you've also expressed grave doubts as to whether
]intelligence
]could arise by accident, as opposed to design.

I did no such thing.  I expressed grave doubts that a computer could
accidentally become intelligent.

]>Only because you are reading into my comments what you want to see.  I
]
]Why should I want you to see any particular views on your part?

Because if you saw my arguments as what they are, a simple assertion
that you have no logical basis for your faith, then you would be faced
with either giving up your faith or admiting the religious nature of
your beliefs.  To avoid either painful consequence, you prefer either
to make my statements into foolishness or into a different religion.
Either way they can be safely ignored.

]I do not have blind faith in the behaviorist method of detecting mental things
](here you seem to be reading into my comments what you want to see :-(), but
]for now I do not see any other alternative. If you convince me that there is
]a better method, I'll only be too happy. I find the behaviorist
]method far from]satisfactory, but I am resigned to it (for now at
]least) since not only myself, 

The fact that there is nothing better than X does not make X any
better.  So if X was unfounded to begin with, then it is still
unfounded.  So much is elementary.  So your comment "I am resigned to
it" is just another way of saying that you accept it as meaningful
even though you have no logical basis for doing so.  "Faith" is
usually used in the sense of "belief in something with no logical
basis", and in that sense your belief is a faith.

]... So I see two alternatives: either use this defective method or shut
]up and wait for better times. Note however that no one has even proven that
]a better method exist, so may be nothing better is possible.

Didn't I already point out the third alternative?  Simply point out
that the method is useless (not merely defective) and admit that you
currently have no method of detecting consiousness in others.

Bob: Hey, I'm looking for a quarter I lost.

Jim: Where did you lose it?

Bob: It fell though that drain over there.

Jim: So why are you looking for it here?

Bob: Well, I couldn't get into the drain, so I thought maybe some
miracle happened that would make it come up here where I could get to
it.

]I used the word 'soul', but we are not going to argue about a specific term,
]are we?).

There is a great difference between minds and souls.  Souls, for
example, are immortal and presuppose at least dualism.  None of my
comments require either immortal souls or dualism.
--
					David Gudeman
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
noao!arizona!gudeman


