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Article 3265 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Jan29.210141.26133@cs.yale.edu>
Summary: Yes, ethics is a problem
Keywords: ethics,functionalism,materialism
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Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1992 21:01:41 GMT
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I agree with Michael Gemar that functionalism raises significant
ethical issues.  Actually, all it really does is highlight issues
already raised by materialism.  If materialism is true, then some
collections of atoms are moral agents and have moral value, and it
should strike us as amazing that this should be the case.

Let me distinguish between two brands of materialism: mundane and
transcendent.  Mundane materialism is the doctrine that the mind will
turn out to be explainable in terms of mechanisms we already
understand, such as computers, feedback loops, winner-take-all
networks, etc.  Transcendent materialism is the doctrine that,
although there is some materialistic explanation of the mind, it will
involve aspects of matter that we haven't dreamed of yet.  There are a
remarkable number of transcendent materialists, including Searle,
Chomsky, Fodor (I think), and Chalmers (apparently).  The most extreme
example is Colin McGinn, who believes that the aspect of matter that
explains its ability to produce mind will be forever beyond our
ability to comprehend.

I find transcendent materialism to be a somewhat underhanded position,
in that it allows one to profit from all the advantages of dualism
while claiming to be a card-carrying materialist.  That's because the
as-yet-unknown features of matter that account for mind can have
whatever properties are handy.  In the context of ethics, one can
suppose that some configurations of matter just have "ethical"
properties, and if that sounds silly just shrug and say that perhaps
in some far-off time it will become clear just how matter can have an
ethical aspect in a way that will (a) not detract from its brute
matterness, while (b) be comforting to us.

Functionalists, including me, refuse to take this easy way out.  I am
willing to bet that all the future "aspects" of matter that we
discover will resemble the aspects we now know about, in that they
will be governed entirely by indifferent mechanical laws.  That's why
I think we should insist that cognitive science propose and evaluate
models of mind using mundane mechanisms.  [And that's why it seems to
me that Dennett's theory of mind is on the right track; but I
digress.]  Hence we cannot postpone the ethical horror show into the
indefinite future when all problems will gently fade away into a mist
of appreciation for the transcendent qualities of matter properly
understood.

                                             -- Drew McDermott




