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Article 3261 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: tesar@tigger.Colorado.EDU (Bruce Tesar)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Jan29.194537.3658@colorado.edu>
Date: 29 Jan 92 19:45:37 GMT
References: <1992Jan28.004208.27238@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Jan28.165322.25735@colorado.edu> <1992Jan29.162643.29519@psych.toronto.edu>
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In article <1992Jan29.162643.29519@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <1992Jan28.165322.25735@colorado.edu> tesar@tigger.Colorado.EDU (Bruce Tesar) writes:
>>In article <1992Jan28.004208.27238@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>>
>>... lots of stuff on Panpsychism and AI deleted ...
>>>
>>>However, I think that you point out one *very* good reason above to 
>>>believe that consciousness is *not* merely descriptive, and that the
>>>moral consequences if it is.  If there is no fact of the matter whether
>>>something is conscious, then morality (or at least most versions of it)
>>>goes out the window.  Why should I treat *you* as conscious, if that is
>>>merely a "descriptive" term?  And therefore, why should I treat you as any
>>>more worthy of ethical consideration than a rock, or a roomfull of air, or
>>>a computer?
>>>
>>    You could start by explaining why I should treat *you* as more worthy
>>of ethical consideration than a rock, given that you are conscious and
>>the rock is not. What is so important about being conscious?
>
>Well, to give the argument from authority, consciousness (or some variant
>on it, such as the ability to have plans, goals, desires) has been seen as
>the main feature of entities worthy of moral concern since probably the
>beginning of moral philosophy.  To give the argument from common sense,
>if you *do* believe in morality, what other distinctions would you draw?
>(Of course, if you don't believe in the worth of ethics, then this exchange
>is meaningless.)
>
>- michael
> 

    I'm not sure how useful a statement like the above is, unless the
various moral philosophies come equipped with useful definitions of
conciousness. In your case, you might want to figure out which is the
cart and which is the horse. Does it make sense to base your entire
moral system on consciousness, and THEN decide what consciousness is?

    As for alternatives, what is wrong with simply declaring that
HUMAN BEINGS are the agents worthy of moral concern? The category is
well-recognized in all cultures, and even has a sound scientific meaning.
A computer, no matter how intelligent and/or conscious it becomes, is
still not a human being.

    Are the comatose and the severely retarded less worthy of moral
consideration than fully functional humans?

-- 
Bruce B. Tesar                    Internet:  tesar@cs.colorado.edu
Computer Science Department
University of Colorado at Boulder 
Boulder, CO  USA  80309-0430


